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Jack and Jill Go to C-ourt: 
Litigating a Peer Sexual arassment 
Case Under Title 
Susan P. Stuartt 
Abstract 
Title IX peer sexual harassment cases present challenges to litigators 
because of the unique educational environment in which these cases 
arise. This Article attempts to educate litigators on the prima facie case, 
evidentiary issues, and the overall presentation of peer sexual harass~ 
ment cases. 
Introduction 
Trying any case involving public schools can be difficult in the best 
of times. Courts are often loathe to interfere in the educational process 
because of schools' greater and somewhat specialized expertise in matters 
of legitimate pedagogi.cal concem1 and because of the long-held notions 
that the running of the schools is best left to local and state contro1.2 
There is some merit to that aloofness: In matters of education policy and 
the like, challenges to curriculum, teaching methods, and other assorted 
t B.A. ( 1973 ), DePauw University; M.Ed. (197 6), Valparaiso University; J.D. ( 1982 ), 
Indiana University-Indianapolis School of Law. The author is an Associate Professor 
of Law at Valparaiso University School ofLaw. Professor Stuart would like to thank 
Chuck Waller, whose work as her research assistant was timely and invaluable; Ivan 
Bodensteiner for graciously agreeing to read and coJmlent on the Article; Melody 
Richardson Daily at University ofMissouri-Columbia Law School for her wonderfully 
constructed Title IX legal writing problem that sparked the idea for this Article; and the 
members of her 2004-05 legal writing class for their inspiration. 
1 E.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272-73 (1988) (school 
district may control student speech so long as such control is "reasonably related to 
legitimate-pedagogical concerns"); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 3384.0 (1985) 
(schools are special environments in which the health and safety of children are high 
priorities). · 
2 E.g., Bd. ofEduc., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 
853, 863-64 ( 1982) (recognizing that "local school boards have broad discretion in the-
management of school affairs"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 ( 1923) (noting 
that "(t]he power of the state to compel school attendance[,] ... to make reasonable 
regulations for all schools," and "to prescribe a curriculum for institutions which it 
supports" is not questioned). 
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educational functions are better left to the professional judgment and 
discretion of school districts and their employees. Thus, so long as the 
school districts are not violating their students' constitutional or civil 
rights during the course of exercising that professional judgment and 
discretion, 3 courts will more than likely leave them alone. Even in those 
instances, schools are considered a special environment wherein the law 
will allow a little more leeway for the control of constitutional rights than 
in other venues.4 
Where courts seem to have more expertise-or at least are more likely 
to interfere-are matters in which a student has been injured, be it through 
traditional tort liability, special tort liability for schools, student discipline, 
or criminal activity.5 Courts somehow feel more comfortable taking on 
a legal role in areas of expertise that have more lawyer-ese and less 
education-ese. These easy legal questions are torts committed against 
students and similar duty issues, such as schools' negligent or reckless 
supervision of students resulting in injury. True, special considerations 
may apply in these cases because of the type of victims and th'e special 
environment, that is, public school students and the environment neces-
sary to care for, protect, and teach them.6 
However, such special educational circumstances do not seem to 
translate well into all civil rights violations. One such circumstance is 
suspicionless drug testing, when a school district determines that its own, 
3 Public school students do not shed their constitutional rights "at the schoolhouse 
gate., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty~ Sch. Dist, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
4 See, e.g., Bd. ofEduc. oflndep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 ofPottawatomie Countyv. Earls, 
536 U.S. 822,838 (2002) (school policy allowing drug testing of students participating 
in extracurricular activities); Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 271-73 (control of 
student speech); Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(school uniforrn policy). 
s See, e.g., Borne ex rei. Borne v. Northwest Allen County Sch. Corp., 532 N.E.2d 
1196 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (special schoolC:{istrictliability); Chrysingerv. Decatur, 445 
N.E.2d260 (Ohio Ct.App. 1982) (student discipline); Maxwell ex rei. Maxwell v. Sch. 
Dist. ofPbila., 53 F. Supp. 2d 787 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (traditional tort liability); Johnson 
ex rei. Johnson v. Sch. Dist. ofMillard, 573 N.W.2d 116 (Neb. 1998) (special school 
district liability). 
6 Indeed, the notion of in loco parentis may be making a comeback. Compare New 
Jersey, 469 U.S. at 336 (student searches are not conducted. as a function of in loco 
parentis) with Earls, 536 U.S. at 830-31 (student searches are conducted because schools 
are guardians). 
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personal "War on Drugs" necessitates that students be treated with no 
more respect for their privacy than cattle to the slaughter. 7 Such programs 
are "capricious, even perverse. "8 Nevertheless, school districts have been 
given a great deal of discretion and local control in such cases. 
Into this mix of easy personal injury cases and difficult civil rights 
cases are thrown Title IX sexual harassment claims. For courts, a teacher-
on-student sexual harassment claim appears to be easy on its face. Courts 
have had increasingly comprehensive experience under comparable Title 
Vll sexual harassment claims by employees against supervisors in the past 
few years. Hence, courts can act lawyerly when it comes to students 
being harassed by teachers: They know it when they see it. Indeed, the 
act of sexual h·arassment was not even at issue in Gebser v. Lago Vista 
Independent School District, when a teacher had sexual intercourse with 
an under-agedstudent.9 So given their parallels to Title Vllcases, student-
on-student (or peer) sexual harassment cases should be among those 
lawyerly cases with which courts would not have any problems. Not so. 
The difficulty in trying student-on-student, or peer, sexual harassment 
cases is two-fold: First, courts are loathe to hold schools liable for sexual 
harassment under Title IX under any circumstances. The proof of the 
teacher's harassment in Gebserwas indisputable, but the school district's 
accountability was not. 10 To insulate a school district from being liable 
for acts of discrimination of which it was not "aware" 11-the secret sexual 
relationship of one of its teachers with a student-the Supreme Court aban-
doned employer-employee vicarious liability under respondeat superior.12 
Instead, a wronged student must prove that "an official who at a minimum 
has authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute 
corrective measures on the [school district's] behalfha[ d] actual knowl-
edge of discrimination" and responded with deliberate indifference. 13 
7 See Earls, 536 U.S. 822; Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v .. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
8 Earls, 536 U.S. at 843 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
9 524 u.s. 274, 292 (1998). 
10 Gebser, 524 U.S. at 292. 
11 Also integral to the Court's restrictive analysis of school district liability was 
Congress' failure to create an express right of action for Title IX sexual harassment 
claims. Gebser, 524 U .. S. at 285. 
12/d. 
13 /d. at 290 (emphasis added). 
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Adding to the difficulty is that Title IX is funding legislation without an 
express private right of action. As a consequence, the obligation of a 
school district to its students to comply with Title IX is more an arm's-
length contractual relationship as a condition of funding rather than a 
more personal obligation as directly imposed by Title Vll. 14 
Second, the rules of engagement in peer sexual harassment cases seem 
to require paying more attention to this special pedagogical environment 
and its special considerations. The playing field is different from Title 
VII sexual harassment causes of action for no other discernible reason 
than that the players-victims and harassers-are all public school students. 
Courts become confused in this environment and outside their lawyerly 
function, not because the cause of action is too educational or pedagogi-
cal, but because the environment is in a foreign landscape: a school. To_ 
better litigate these cases, counsel must lea1n to navigate the topography 
of that environment and persuade a court that the environment is not all 
that special in these tort-like cases, a distinction that does not seem to 
matter in teacher-on-student sexual harassment cases and clearly does not 
matter in other personal injury cases that occur on school grounds. 
Under such constrictions, there should be little wonder at the difficulty 
in trying a Title IX peer sexual harassment case.15 However, with a better 
handle on that educational environment and on courts' concerns about 
their own expertise, a litigator has effective ways to try these cases. In 
particular, a litigator might better educate courts to the supervisory 
liability of school districts and their deliberate indifference to that liability 
in matters of harassment just as they are in tort cases. With a litigator's 
perspective in mind, Part I analyzes the prima facie case for Title IX peer 
sexual harassment in the K-12 public schools. Part II addresses eviden-
tiary issues to confront the inevitable motion for sununaryjudgment filed 
by the school district that successfully tertninates most of these cases. 
Part ill then discusses ways to incorporate greater knowledge of the edu-
cational environment to improve the presentation of the case. Winning 
these cases will never be easy-indeed other, more winnable causes of 
14 /d. at 286-87. 
15 See also Meghan E. Chemer-Ranft, The Empty Promise of Title IX· Why Girls 
Need Courts to Reconsider Liability Standards and Preemption in School Sexual 
Harassment Cases, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1891 (2003). 
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action may better ameliorate the underlying problems16-but ways exist 
to confront the courts' concerns about these special envirorunents that 
tend to favor school districts rather than students. 
I. Davis ex rei. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County 
Board o · Education and the Prima Facie Case 
Title IX prohibits discrimination in public schools on the basis of sex: 
~'No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded 
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance .... " 17 On the shoulders of Cannon v. University of 
Chicago18 and Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 19 the Supreme 
Court set out the contours of a school district's liability for sexual 
harassment of a student by a teacher in Gebser v. La go Vista Independent 
School District.20 
In Gebser') there was no question that sexual harassment occtJrred when 
a male high school teacher had sexual intercourse on numerous occasions 
with a freshman female student.21 While the school district claimed it 
was unaware of this sexual relationship, the student-plaintiffinsisted that 
the school district was liable for the teacher's misconduct and that such 
liability should be based on the same standard used for Title Vll 
supervisor~on-employee sexual harassment, simple agency principles that 
16 Title IX is not a very effective way to remedy the assaults, batteries, and .other 
injuries suffered by children, which are litigated as acts of sexual harassment. See I van 
E. Bodensteiner, Peer Harassment-Interference with an Equal Educational Opportunity 
in Elementary and Secondary Schools, 79 NEB. L. REv. 1, 43-47 (2000)~ However, to 
the extent that Title IX does indeed try to rectify the ''discriminatory impact" of sexual 
misconduct in schools, a few nice-sized judgments and loss of federal funding might 
just tum a few bea.ds. Change necessarily starts small. 
17 20 U.S.C. § 168l{a) (1994). 
18 441 U.S. 677 ( 1979). Title IX provides for an implied private right of action. /d. 
at 703. 
19 503 U.S. 60 (1992). A victim can recover monetary damages for a violation of 
Title IX when a teacher sexually harasses a student. /d .. at 76. 
20 524 u.s. 274 (1998). 
21 /d. at 278. 
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would have imputed liability to the school district.22 However, the 
Supreme Court meandered tlrrough a convoluted statutory interpretation 
and analysis of liability under Title IX to conclude that the Title VII 
statutory analysis cannot apply.23 In addition, the Court was uncomfort-
able with jerry-rigging liability on schools without Congress' express 
pennission, so Justice O'Connor instead relied on intuition and baling 
wire to construct a contract theory to establish a school district's liability 
for proven sexual harassment by a teacher. This contractual construct for 
scaling back liability for student sexual harassment is premised on Title 
IX' s fundin_g "agreement" between the govennnent and the school district. 
The public school districts will countenance no gender discrimination in 
exchange for the distribution of federal funds to help run their schools. 24 
22 /d. at 283; see also Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) {Title 
VII supervisor-on-employee sexual harassment). 'fhat agency liability arises when the 
employer knew or should have known of the harassing behavior and failed to stop it; 
see for example, Burlington Industries Incorporated v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 758-59 
(1998). 
23 Justice O'Connor reached this result because Title VII's statutory defmition of 
"employer"-whicb includes an "agent" of the employer-has no comparable parallel 
definition in Title IX's fimding entity, an "educational institution." Gebser, 524 U.S. 
at 283. However, this statutory interpretation makes no sense because "educational 
institution" does not show up in the prohibitory language ofTitle IX as "employer'' does 
in Title VII. Title VII prohibits unlawful employment practices by an employer. 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). On the other hand, Title IX prohibits the discrimination 
''under any education program or activity receiving Federal fmancial assistance." 20 
U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994) (emphasis added). Thus, the meaning of"educational institu-
tion" does not even enter into who can or cannot be held liable for the. discrimination 
under Title IX. Instead, the prohibition applies to "program or activity," which includes 
''all of the operations of ... a local educational agency." 20 U .S.C. -§ l687(2)(B) (1988). 
A ulocal educational agency" means 
a public board of education or other public authority legally constituted within 
a State for either administrative control or direction of, or to perforrn a service 
fimction for, public elementary schools or secondary schools in a city, county, 
township, school district, or other political subdivision of a State, or of or for 
a combination of school districts or counties that is recognized in a State as an 
administrative agency for its public elementary schools or secondary schools. 
20 U.S.C. § 7801(26)(A) (2003). That is not the same thing as Justice O'Connor's 
concern for an "educational institution." Nor does the "agency" of an employee of an 
educational institution or local educational agency seem to have anything to do with 
liability under Title IX. 
24 Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286. 
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This promise by a school district is to "'protect[]' individuals from dis-
criminatory practices carried out by recipients of federal funds. "25 By this 
logic, according to Justice O'Connor, a school district cannot protect a 
student from a discriminatory practice of which it is unaware.26 
Justice 0' Connor's conclusion also relied on the statutory enforcement 
scheme under Title IX whereby a funding recipient is entitled an oppor-
tunity to get into compliance by correcting the discrimination before its 
funding is withdrawn.27 Thus, a person capable of taking corrective 
measures for the school district must be aware of the problem but fail to 
respond to the problem, in other words, be deliberately indifferent. 28 In 
Gebser, the school district was not aware of the sexual congress of its 
teacher with a fourteen-year-old student, so no liability could attach under 
the contract, and the school district was not liable.29 Once the school 
district knew of the problem-the couple was caught in the act-it fired the 
teacher, and the school district instituted corrective action. Too late for 
the plaintiffs injury, however. The school district was not liable for past 
acts of which it was unaware and for which it could not have enacted 
corrective measures,30 so there was no deliberate indifference. 
Thus, the basic proof of teacher-on-student sexual harassment is (1) 
an act of sexual harassment by a teacher, of which (2) a school official 
who has the authority to take corrective action31 (3) has actual knowledge, 
( 4) but that official acts with deliberate indifference in failing to take such 
action. The contractual duty to protect students from discrimination only 
2s /d. at 287. 
26/d. 
27 /d. at 288-89. 
28 /d. at 290. 
29 /d. at 291. 
30 What "corrective measures" could any school institute under such circumstances? 
Give the student back her virginity? 
31 It is ironic a school district will not be held liable under agency principles for 
actually having engaged in sexual harassment, but it will be held liable for sexual 
harassment if one of its agents acts incorrectly. As a consequence of the Davis reason-
ing, one sees a result exemplified by Rasnick v. Dickenson County School Board, 333 
F. Supp. 2d 560 (W.D. Va. 2004). In Rasnick, the school district avoided all liability 
for teacher-on-student sexual harassment by proving that none of its board members 
knew of the harassing teacher's activity. Because only the board could take the ap-
propriate corrective measures, the district was not liable regardless of its school 
administrators' knowledge and failure to act. /d. at 565-67. 
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kicks in when the school is actually aware that such activity is occurring. 
The Title IX standard for civil liability is thus more protective of the 
institution and less protective of the victim;32 it is no longer a duty to 
protect, but a duty to stop. Gebser and its reasoning eventually fortned 
the foundation for student-on-student, or peer, sexual harassment under 
Title IX. 
This foundation for determining school district liability under Title 
IX has a serious ramification in its contractual analysis that carries over 
into any analysis ofliability for peer sexual harassment. The Court turned 
a school district's contractual obligation into a "one-bite" rule. Under 
the Gebser analysis, a predatory teacher gets one bite at a student; past 
acts of discrimination are not remediable, only future ones are, despite 
the school district's contractual promise to protect students from sexual 
harassment under Title IX. Thus, Gebser set the stage for a loose web 
of supervisory liability through which numerous student injuries may flow 
without recourse.33 As it turns out, the web of supervisory liability for 
peer sexual harassment has even larger holes, so large as to make the web 
almost nonexistent. 
In Davis ex rei. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Board of Education, 
the Supreme Court put its imprimatur on student-on-student sexual 
harassment as a private cause of action under Title IX.34 In deriving a 
prima facie case, Justice O'Connor adopted a rule in Davis for later 
application that is unavoidably linked to the sheer amount of evidence 
of ovetwhelmingly bad harassment that this plaintiff endured before filing 
suit. The case involved allegations brought by a fifth-grade female 
student, LaShonda, against G.F., one of her male classmates. Fifth-
graders are usually ten or eleven years old, but G.F. was a bad actor in 
many adult senses of the word. According to the complaint, he tried to 
touch LaShonda's breasts and genital area while telling her he wanted 
32 See Julie Davies, Assessing Institutional Responsibility for Sexual Harassment 
in Education, 77 TuL. L. REv. 387,401-408 (2002) (examining the viability of private 
enforcement of Title IX). 
33 Compare this attitude with the Court's tighter net in the "War on Drugs" lest any 
drug-using students get away. See, e.g., Earls, 536 U.S. at 822-24 (holding that a 
school's policy of drug testing students who participated in extracurricular activities did 
not violate the Fourth Amendment). 
34 526 u.s. 629, 629-30 (1999). 
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to "get in bed" with her and wanted to feel her breasts. He also rubbed 
up against her in a sexual manner. On one occasion, G.F. put a door stop 
in his pants during physical educ-ation class and acted in a sexually sug-
gestive manner to LaShonda. This conduct occurred during the course 
of several months and not just to LaS honda but to other girls in the class 
as well. These acts eventually led to G.F.'s being charged with and 
pleading guilty to sexual battery.35 
LaS honda further alleged that she and her mother complained repeat-
edly to her classroom teacher and her physical education teacher, but her 
complaints went unanswered. Indeed, it took three months of complaints 
before LaS honda's classroom seating was switched so she would not have 
to sit next to G.F. Even her female classmates were unable to get an 
audience with the principal; a teacher told them, "'If[ the principal] wants 
you, he'll call you. '"36 G.F. was never disciplined, and the principal asked 
LaShonda' smother why she was the only one complaining. 37 LaS honda's 
complaint set out her sufferings at the hands ofG.F.: She could not con-
centrate in school and experienced a drop in her previously high grades. 
She also wrote a suicide note, which her father discovered. She filed suit 
under Title IX and was instantly challenged by the school district.38 
The Supreme Court determined that LaShonda's complaint should 
survive the school district's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6). In so doing, the Court formulated the following 
elements that a plaintiff must prove in order to hold a school district liable 
for peer sexual harassment under Title IX: (1) the sexually harassing 
student engages in conduct that is "so severe, pervasive, and objectively 
offensive" that (2) it "can be said to deprive the victim[] of access to the 
educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school,'' and (3) the 
educational institution has actual knowledge of such harassment ( 4) but 
is deliberately indifferent to it.39 
35 !d. at 633-35. 
36 /d. at 635. 
37 Also according to the allegations, the school district had instituted no training for 
its personnel to deal with peer sexual harassment and had no official policy governing 
its reporting and discipline. /d. 
38 /d. at 634. 
39 /d. at 650; Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 186 F.3d 1238, 1246 (lOth 
Cir. 1999). This rule is closely akin to the hostile work environment rule under Title 
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In Davis as it did in Gebser, the Court concentrated on the school 
district's own misconduct in detetmining that it could be held responsible 
for peer sexual harassment and focused on intentional conduct that would 
violate the clear terms of Title IX.40 Shaded somewhat by her pursuit of 
a Title IX contractual duty in Gebser, Justice O'Connor's analysis 
examined school districts' conunon law duties to protect students from 
third-party tortious behavior of other students.41 She especially noted that 
schools have a "custodial and tutelary'' responsibility over students that 
gives them a higher supervisory responsibility and control not ex_ercised 
in other circumstances by the state over adults.42 In this respect, Justice 
O'Connor acknowledged the special educational environment in which 
peer sexual harassment can occur and concluded that a school district can 
be held liable for a student's actions because it has substantial control 
over that student, over the harassing environment, and, under certain con-
ditions, over the harassment itself~43 But then she injected the business-
like, contractual responsibility ofTitle IX by asserting that school district 
liability arises when it "subjects'' students to discrimination under an 
"operation" of the educational institution.44 Swerving from the typical 
supervisory liability of schools, the lawyerly, business-like cause of action 
VII, except that it requires an adverse educational consequence that the hostile work 
environment claim no longer requires. See, e.g., Burlington, 524 U.S. at 758-59 (holding 
that an employer must show it exercised reasonable care in preventing harassment and 
that employee did not take advantage of preventive or corrective measures); Meritor 
Sav. Bank, FSB, 4 77 U.S. at 68, 72 (holding that economic hattn is not necessary to bring 
a sexual harassment case and that the existence of an employer's policy against 
discrimination will not insulate it from liability); see generally VernaL. Williams & 
Deborah L. Brake, When a Kiss Jsn ,t Just a Kiss: Title IX and Student-to-Student 
Harassment, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 423, 427~29; 442-456 (1997). But see Frazier v. 
Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 27 6 F .3d 52 (1st Cir. 2002). According to Frazier v. Fairhaven 
School Committee, a plaintiff must prove "(1) that [she] was a student, who was (2) 
subjected to harassment (3) based upon sex; (4) that the harassment was sufficiently 
severe and pervasive to create an abusive educational environment; and ( 5) that a 
cognizable basis for institutional liability exists." /d. at 66. There is no formal require-
ment of an adverse educational consequence. 
40 . . . 
· Dav1s, 526 U.S. at 641-42. 
41 /d. at 644. 
42 . . /d. at 646. 
43 /d. at 644. 
44 /d. at 64445. 
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from Gebser is infected with the messier, educational role of the school's 
special circ\Jmstances over its charges. That new spin on proving Title 
IX violations for peer sexual harassment equally infects the manner of 
proving a prima facie case. 
First, theplaintiffmust prove that the harasser engaged in actionable 
sexual harassment, conduct that is severe, pervasive, and objectively 
offensive.45 Moving from the educational special environment to the 
lawyerly, business-like analysis, Justice O'Connor relied on a test from 
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,46 a Title Vll same-sex 
harassment case, that proof of a hostile working environment ''depends 
on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and rela-
tionships which are not fully captured by a simple recitation of the words 
used or the physical acts performed. "47 Continuing to follow Oncale, the 
Court detennined that actionable conduct could cover circumstances when 
the school "is pertneated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and 
insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the 
victim's [educational opportunity] and create an abusive [school] environ-
ment. "48 That constellation of circumstances includes such things as the 
ages ofthe harasser and victim and the number of stud.ents involved, but 
the Court was not too keen on getting into any other specifics except to 
say what such conduct is not: peer sexual harassment is not mere teasing 
and name-calling. Apparentlypersuad~d by the National School Boards 
Association brief, Justice O'Connor was reluctant to punish all gender-
related behavior in which children are commonly wont to engage that 
might otherwise be unacceptable to adults. Thus, "insults, banter, teasing, 
45 Proof of peer sexual harassment does not .have the extra "hoop" required ofTitle 
VII sexual harassment cases that the victim-also fmd the conductsubjectively offensive. 
See, e.g., Far3gherv. CityofBoca Raton,. 524 U.S. 775,787 (1998). Justice O'Connor 
does not suggest why the victim's subjective view is not important in peer sexual 
harassment in Davis. However, perhaps this lack of emphasis on subjectivity is a 
function of the probable victim's age: the younger the child, the less likelythe child will 
actually understand the sexual nature of the harassment. On the other hand, ·it is just 
as likely that the subjectivity has in reality been replaced by another element of 
O'Connor's rule, the adverse consequence. See infra text accompanying notes 126-48. 
46 523 u.s. 75 (1998). 
47 /d. at 82; Davis, 526 U.S. at 651. 
48 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 
(1993)). 
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shoving, pushing, and gender-specific conduct that is upsetting to the 
students subjected to it" are not enough to constitute actionable peer 
sexual harassment.49 Instead, the Court decried a vague notion of some 
other type of behavior that might constitute severe, pervasive, and 
objectively offensive sexual harassment. 
Whatever the conduct, it must cause the second element of the prima 
facie case, that it is so severe and pervasive that it denies to the victim 
equal access to the educational function of the institution funded by Title 
IX. 50 This somewhat recursive element does not require proof of a 
physical denial of access to the school and its resources. Instead, the 
pervasive nature of the harasser's conduct must be systemic and "so 
unden11ine[] and detract[] from the victims' educational experience, that 
the victim-students are effectively denied equal access to an institution's 
resources and opportunities."51 In so concludjng, Justice O'Connor 
obliquely referred to Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, which 
established that, under Title VII, a plaintiffneed only prove that the sexual 
harassment "alter[ed] the conditions of[the victim's] employment and 
create[ d] an abusive working environment."52 Clearly, Justice O'Connor 
relied on Title VII's hostile work environment test in establishing whether 
a student has been discriminated against in her access to the educational 
program. However, a mere decline in grades is not enough. Again, what 
is enough is not clear, but there must be a '-'systemic effect" of denying 
"equal access to an educational program or activity." Thus, one incident 
likely will not suffice; what will suffice are incidents on the other end of 
the spectrum, "severe, gender-based mistreatment played out on a 'wide-
spread level' among students. "53 In any event, the evidenc-e of a systemic 
effect is tempered by the special educational envirorunent and the 
tolerable conduct of kids being kids. 
Third in a prima facie case is the trigger for school district liability, 
its actual knowledge of the peer sexual harassment in an educational 
49 Davis, 526 U.S. at 651-52 (emphasis added) . 
. so /d. at 652-53. 
51 /d. at 651. 
52 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB, 4 77 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F .2d 897, 
904 (11th Cir. 1982)). 
~3 Davis, 526 U.S. at 653. 
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activity. The Court does not elucidate what facts would constitute actual 
knowledge in a hypothetical instance. However, the Davis evidence 
implied and Justice O'Connor so suggested that LaShonda's and her 
mother's reports to her teachers and her principal would be sufficient 
actual knowledge by individuals who should have controlled the situation 
and therefore imputed knowledge to the school district itself. 54 Direct 
evidence of sexual harassment is sufficient proof: 55 "recipients may be 
liable for their deliberate indifference to known acts of peer sexual 
harassment. " 56 As a consequence, if the harassing conduct is reported 
to a teacher or school administrator, it is a "known act."57 
Fourth and last, the school district's deliberate indifference must 
subject students to harassment by causing them to undergo or "make them 
liable or vulnerable" to sexual harassment. 58 The school district's 
behavior must be "clearly unreasonable in light of the known circum-
stances. "59 Courts will not necessarily second-guess the remedial efforts 
S4 "[P]etitioner may be able to show that the Board 'subject[ed]' LaShonda to dis-
crimination by failing to respond in any way over a period of five months to complaints 
of G .F.'s in-school misconduct from LaShonda and other female students." Davis, 52 6 
U.S. at 649. This proof is, of course, an agency itnputation of liability to the school 
district for the bad acts of its teachers, which seems to somewhat undercut the liability 
analysis of Gebser and Davis itself. "[We] reject[] the use of agency principles to itnpute 
liability to the district for the misconduct of its teachers." /d. at 642. 
55 !d. at 643, 644. 
S6 !d. at 648 (emphasis added). 
57 As a consequence of the clarity with which Justice O'Connor made her point, a 
school district cannot defend itself by claiming it was not on notice that such conduct 
would trigger its liability. Justice O'Connor noted that, in March 1993, the National 
School Boards Association issued a publication advising school boards how to prevent 
sexual harassment in the schools. And by the time Davis was handed down, the United 
States Department of Education issued a Guidance through its Office for Civil Rights 
that advised that student-on-student sexual harassment was proscnbed by Title IX' s anti-
discrimination provisions. Davis, 526 U.S. at 64 7-48. As a consequence, a school dis-
trict's actual knowledge is contextualized by contemporary policies and concerns. In 
other words, actual knowledge is now more easily imputed to school districts because 
peer sexual harassment is a cutting-edge issue that has captured the interest of those 
groups that defme school district policies, thereby putting school districts on notice of 
"proscribed misconduct" for which they will be held accountable. /d. at 648; see infra 
text accompanying notes 200-15. 
ss Davis, 526 U.S. at 644-45 (quotingRANDOMHOUSEDicriONARYOFTHEENGLISH 
LANGUAGE 1415 (1966) (defining "subject'')). 
59 /d. at 649. 
256 AMERJCAN JOURNAL OF TRIAL ADVOCACY [Vol. 29:243 
of school officials in trying to control the situation, but they should 
respond in a manner that is ''not clearly unreasonable.'~ In LaShonda's 
case, the school district did not respond at all for five months. 
Applying this four-part principle to LaS honda's allegations, the Court 
detertnined that the case should proceed, reversing the trial court's 
granting the school district's motion to dismiss. She made a prima facie 
case of peer sexual harassment; from LaShonda's case, subsequent 
plaintiffs can make their cases. 
Obviously, any complaint brought under Title IX for peer sexual 
harassment will have to establish these four elements. Since the Davis 
decision, a 12(b )( 6) motion to dismiss such cases on the basis that no such 
cause of action exists is no longer an option for school districts. 61 That, 
of course, still leaves those cases challenged by a 12(b )( 6) motion because 
the pleadings themselves allegedly lack proof of the elements. For 
instance, in Carroll K. v. Fayette County Board of Education, the school 
district asserted that the plaintiff's pleadings failed to allege that gender-
related harassment occutred, that the school district knew, that the school 
district acted with deliberate indifference, and that the school district had 
the discriminatory intent to violate Title IX.62 The court ruled, to the 
contrary, that the victim pleaded adequately when she alleged that, when 
she was a sixth-grader, she was the victim of several crimes of violence 
(including physical assaults) on school grounds because of her gender. 
The incident that finally prompted the victim's parents to remove her 
from school occ•Jrred during lunch hour when a male student approached 
the victim in a bullying fashion. When the victim was unable to escape, 
the male student threw her over his shoulder, swung her around, and flung 
her into a steel pole. The teacher on duty failed to intervene, saying only, 
"Here we go again." The victim suffered spinal injuries and loss of vision 
in her left eye. The court indicated that these well-pleaded facts overcame 
60 /d. 
61 See also Rowinskyv. Bryanlndep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1016 (5thCir. 1996) 
(peer sexual harassment complaints must allege that female students' complaints are 
treated differently than male students') (pre-Davis); see generally Emmalena K. 
Quesada, Note, Innocent Kiss or Potential Legal Nightmare: Peer Sexual Harassment 
and the Standard for School Liability under .Title IX, 83 CORNELLL. REv. 1 014, 1 03 9-4 7 
(1998). ' 
62 19 F. Supp. 2d 618, 621 (S.D. W.Va. 1998). 
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the school district's 12(b)(6) motion.63 Similar results were reached in 
Haines v. Metropolitan Government of Davidson County, Tennessee64 
and Ray v. Antioch Unified School District,65 wherein the trial courts 
determined that well-pleaded complaints setting forth factual allegations 
of each of the elements would survive a motion to dismiss. Less certain, 
however, is the fate of peer sexual harassment cases on motions for sutn-
mary judgment. 
II. Motion for Summary Judgment: 
Testing the Quality of the Evidence 
A motion for summary judgment is the ultimate test for the quality of 
evidence compiled by the plaintiff before trial. It is an oft-used-and 
successfully so-tool filed by school districts to rid themselves of Title 
IX peer sexual harassment suits.66 Governed by Federal Rules of Civil 
63 Carroll K., 19 F. Supp. at 620-22. The author makes no comment on the efficacy 
of the court's using Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b )( 6) as the appropriate vehicle 
for attacking proof issues when all that is required is notice pleading. 
64 32 F. Supp. 2d 991 (M.D. Tenn. 1998). A Tennessee federal district court denied 
the 12(b)( 6) motion to dismiss filed by the school district in Haines. In that case, two 
male fifth-grade students allegedly tried to rape a classmate. Similar to the victim in 
Davis, Haines alleged multiple instances of assault, fondling, and physical and verbal 
abuse. The victim and her parents lodged repeated complaints to the victim's teacher, 
the school principal, and the school board itself. What little discipline was administered 
was totally ineffective. The victim claimed that, as a result, she missed numerous days 
of school and was unable to satisfactorily complete her classes. The court held that these 
allegations sufficiently constituted a prima facie Title IX peer sexual harassment case. 
Haines, 32 F. Supp. at 999·1000. 
65 107 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2000). In Ray, the school district filed a Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure 12( c) motion for judgment on the pleadings for failure to state 
a cause of action in a case filed for peer sexual harassment for sexual orientation. The 
victim was a middle-school student whose mother was a transgendered female going 
through gender transformation. In his complaint, the victim alleged that he was the 
subject of repeated taunts, insults, and abuse based on the perception that he was 
homosexual. Despite his repeated reports of the harassment, the school district failed 
to take any action to stop the conduct. The ultimate attack occurred when another 
student with a reputatiQn for violence battered the victim, causing a concussion, hearing 
in1pairment in one ear, and chronic headaches. The district court determined that, by 
these allegations, the victim had met his pleading burden sufficient to overcome the 
s.chool district's motion. Ray, 107 F. Supp. at 1167-71. 
66 A cursory examination of the post-Davis reported cases reveal an abysmal success 
rate for plaintiffs. Of the couple dozen cases reported to date in which school districts 
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Pro~edure 56, sununary judgment is granted if"there is no genuine issue 
of material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law." A method for adjudicating cases short of trial, summary 
judgment invokes a review of factual presentations-pleadings, deposi-
tions, the fruits of discovery, and affidavits-when the facts are disputed 
and is the ultimate test of the quality of evidence. 67 A party is not entitled 
to sununary judgment if a reasonable jury could decide the case for either 
party. 68 Because schoo 1 districts are the movants in these cases, the burden 
is on the victim to come up with something more than vague, conclusory 
allegations in order to create a genuine issue of material fact.69 
This burden requires presentation of specific probative facts 70 showing 
that there is a need to go to trial. 71 Even construing the evidence most 
favorably to the nonmovap.t,72 a court must have before it something 
filed motions for s judgment on the Title IX student-on-student sexual 
harassment issue, very few victims made it past the motion. Ironically, more mal~ 
victims were successful at this stage than female victims: Vance v. Spencer County Pub. 
Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2000) (female); Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified Sch. 
Dist. No. 464, 377 F. Supp. 2d 952 (D. Kan. 2005) (male); Schroeder ex rei. Schroeder 
v. Maumee Bd. ofEduc., 296 F. Supp. 2d 869 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (male); Montgomery 
v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 709, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (D. Minn. 2000) (male); see 
generally ROBERT SHOOP & DEBRA L. EDWARDS) How TO STOP SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
IN OUR SCHOOLS: A HANDBOOK AND CURRICULUM GUIDE FOR ADMINISTRATORS AND 
TEACHERS 99-104 ( 1994) (addressing sexual harassment of male students and gay, 
lesbian, and bisexual students). Furthennore, peer sexual harassment cases seem to have 
a lower success rate than teacher-on-student sexual harassment cases. See Davies, supra 
note 32, at 431~33. 
67 
"When a motion for s . judgment is made and supported as provided in this 
rule, an adverse party .... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for trial." FED. R. CIV. P. 56( e); see Gabrielle M. v. Park Forest-Chicago Heights, 
Ill. Sch. Dist. 163, 315 F.3d 817, 822 (7th Cir. 2003). 
68 The test is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require 
submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter 
of law.'' Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). 
69 FED. R. CIV. P .. 56( e); Gabrielle M., 315 F.3d at 822. 
7° FED. R. CIV. P . .56( e). 
71 E.g., Crossley v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 355 F.3d 1112, 1113 (8th Cir. 2004); 
Winn v. United Press Int'l, 938 F. Supp. 39, 46(D.D.C. 1996), ajf'd, 1997 WL404959 
(D.C. Cir. 1997). . -
12 See, e.g., CMM Cable Rep, Inc. v. Ocean Coast Props., Inc., 97 F.3d 1504, 1527-
30 (1st Cir. 1996); Anglemyer v. Hamilton County Hosp., 58 F.3d 533, 536 (lOth Cir. 
1995). 
\ 
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besides conjecture, speculation, and fantasy. 73 Resting on the pleadings 
is also not sufficient. The victim must bring to the gunfight something 
mo.re than "conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsup-
ported speculation. "74 These material facts must be developed as soon 
as it is feasible, if not before the complaint is filed, then immediately 
thereafter. However, one should never rely on the fruits of discovery to 
make one's prima facie case. Rather, plaintiffs counsel needs to build 
the case from the outset with information from which to develop affida-
vits and with any other evidence or official docutnents to which a witness 
will attest. When a school district's typical opening gambit is to suggest 
that there are no genuine issues of material fact to show it is not liable, 
the immediate response must be to show there is such a dispute su-fficient 
to go to trial. And that means the litigator has to have facts for each of 
the elements. 
In addition, counsel must account for and tinge those facts within the 
specialized educational environment. Preparing a case for peer sexual 
harassment will require conscious preparation for entering what is the 
undisputed bailiwick of the school district's counsel. Consequently, 
victims' lawyers must be prepared contextually for these motions, to the 
point of gathering information from expert witnesses familiar with the 
area. Even at the summary judgment stage, plaintiff must outmaneuver 
the school district's essential strength: the court's willingness to cut it 
some slack because of special educational circumstances and legitimate 
pedagogical concerns arising in the school environment, and because 
running these enterprises is left to the discretion of the local school boards 
as outside the expertise of the court. Plaintiffs counsel will.have to take 
the fight to the school boards. 75 
n . . E.g., Wilson v. I.B.M. Corp., 62 F.3d 237, 241 (8th Cir. 1995). 
74 E.g., Coil v. PB Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 50 F.3d 1115, 1121 (1st Cir. 1995); Celex 
Group, Inc .. v. Executive Gallery, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 1114, 1134 (N.D. Ill. 1995). 
75 As a tactical matter, one might consider filing a cross-motion for s · · judg-
ment on one element that engenders synlPathy for the victim Preparing a well-founded 
issue as a matter of law will at least detract some attention from the school district's 
motion. One might also consider whether filing in state court might give a strategic 
advantage on summary judgment. For exarnple, winning a motion for s · judgment 
is harder in Indiana under Indiana Trial Rule 56 than under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56 because the reasonable jury standard does not apply. Compare Anderson, 
477 U.S. at 250, with Link v. Breen, 649 N.E.2d 126, 128 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). 
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The following are suggestions for gathering facts for and otherwise 
preparing against stttnmary judgment and each element of a Title IX peer 
sexual harassment case. 
A. Hostile School Environment: Actionable 
Harassme.nt and the Denial of Educational Benefits 
Two elements of the prima facie peer sexual harassment case flow 
seamlessly one into the other and thus are of that nature that is the bane 
of a litigator's existence. Those elements are whether the harasser's 
conduct was severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive, and whether 
such conduct prevented the victim from having equal access to the 
educational opportunities offered by the school district. To the extent that 
they cannot be unwound from each other-they pose more a recursive 
cause-and-effect scenario rather than two discrete elements-proving one 
or the other as distinct elements may be difficult. On the other hand, the 
fact that they turn on each other could be to plaintiffs advantage by 
presenting evidence that one element is so egregiously bad that, on 
balance, the court will be more lenient on the matter of proof of the other. 
Perhaps the best way to describe these two elements is the two steps 
of the analysis for hostile environment: one is the objective and the other 
is the subjective test.76 They constitute a type ofbalancing that suggests 
that, if an objective view of the conduct is so egregious, less bad effects 
are necessary and vice versa. Thrown into the mix of the subjective 
analysis, however, is the arnount of frustration and fear engendered by 
the school district's deliberate indifference to the matter. Sometimes, it 
is just too much for a schoolchild to cope with by himself, especially if 
one considers the special circumstances of the victims, children aged five 
to eighteen. 
The two elements are also an odd combination ofhostile environment 
proof (th.e actionable conduct) and quid pro quo harassment proof {the 
16 Cf. Anne-Marie Harris & Kenneth B. Grooms, A New Lesson Plan for Educational 
Institutions: Expanded Rules Governing Liability Under Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972for Student and Faculty Sexual Harassment, 8 AM .. U. J. GENDER 
Soc. POL'Y &L. 575, 602 (2000) (asserting that Title IX sexual harassment follows Title 
VII's objective-subjective analysis). 
• 
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adverse consequence) that Justice Kennedy distinguished in Burlington 
Industries v. Ellerth:11 
Cases based on threats which [sic] are carried out are referred to often as 
quid pro quo cases, as distinct from bothersome attentions or sexual remarks 
that are sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment. 
The terms quid pro quo and hostile work environment are helpful . . . in 
making a rough demarcation between cases in which threats are carried out 
and those where they are not or are absent altogether . . . . The principal 
significance of the distinction is to instruct that Title VII is violated by either 
explicit or constructive alterations in the tenns or conditions of employment 
' [quid pro quo] and to explain the latter must be severe or pervasive [hostile 
work environment].78 
In El/erth, the Court actually backed away from the distinction between 
the two types ofharassment in determining that an employee could bring 
a Title VII sexual harassment claim against an employer for the acts of 
its supervisor even without an adverse job consequence. As a result, an 
employee does not have to prove "adverse, tangible job consequences" 
when she refuses her supervisor's threatening and unwanted sexual 
advances then sues her employer.79 Public school students, however, have 
to prove characteristics of both: a hostile environment and an adverse 
effect as if it were a quid pro quo case.80 Together, however, they 
77 524 u.s. 742 (1998)-
78 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 751-52; see also Henson, 682 F.2d at 908-911; see generally 
Stacey .R. Rinestine, Comment, Terrorism on the Playground: What Can Be Done?, 
32 DUQ. L. REv. 799, 804-07 (1994). 
79 The Court did, however, formulate an affirmative defense to such a suit if the 
employer can prove that it exercised reasonable care in preventing or correcting such 
behavior, and the harassed employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of the 
employer's efforts or otherwise to avoid the ham1. Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S. 
at 765~ 
80 Imagining a quid pro quo context for public schoolchildren is difficult because 
such harassment is most associated with victims who perceive something to gain or to 
lose from the sexual relationship. In institutions of higher education, the quid pro quo 
analysis might work for teacher-on-student sexual harassment as an avenue to higher 
grades. Similar concerns might motivate secondary school students (and maybe 
precocious elementary students), but the younger the child, the less likely that quid pro 
quo considerations are any factor. Less so is there any quid pro quo motivation to peer 
sexual harassment. 
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constitute the hostile environment81 proof that the plaintiff must present 
to get beyond a motion for sutrunary judgment on this issue as well as the 
first, the harasser's conduct.82 
Although one would think that its fact-specific nature would preclude 
such use, the character of the harasser's conduct has often been the subject 
of sun1mary judgment. And, on occasion, a school district has prevailed 
on that issue. 83 
One difficulty in developing evidence to a level sufficient to prove 
actionable harassment is the vagueness of the adjectival phrase ''severe, 
pervasive, and objectively offensive." No precise meaning has been 
attributed to these words in peer harassment cases, but the conduct must 
be either sexually oriented or targeted at a victim because of gender. 
Obviously, the sheer weight of evidence of harassing conduct can get a 
plaintiff past summary judgment, not just the character of the conduct. 
More specific guidance from the reported cases is scant; few Title IX 
sexual harassment cases are reported. Thus, one might find analogous 
hostile envirorunent analysis and proof in Title VII case law if for no other 
·reason than to attach meanings to "severe" and ''pervasive." However, 
counsel must keep in mind that Title VII cases are disjunctive only one 
needs to be proved-while Title IX cases are conjunctive; both must be 
proved along ·with objective (not subjective) offensiveness.84 
81 See, e.g., Frazier, 276 F .3d at 52. 
82 This test is not unlike the defmition of"hostile working environment" wtder Title 
Vll: ''To establish hostile work environment, plaintiffs ~ .. must show harassing behavior 
'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [their] employment."' 
Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004). Furthennore, "a sexually 
objectionable enviromnent must be both 'Objectively and subjectively offensive, one that 
a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim in fact did 
perceive to be so." Faragherv. CityofBocaRaton, 524 U.S. 775,787 (1998) (citations 
omitted). 
83 See, e.g., Hawkins v. Sarasota County Sch. Bd., 322 F.3d 1279, 1288-89 (11th 
Cir. 2003) (holding that alleged behavior was not severe enough to have a "systernatic 
effect" of denying girls access to an educational program as required under a Title IX 
claim against the school district); Gabrielle M., 315 F .3d at 822; Cubie v. Bryan Career 
Coli., Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1203-04 (D. 'Kan. 2003). 
84 See, e.g., Williams & Brake, supra note 39, at 442-56. If only for the minimal 
rubric, Title Vll cases on sexual harassment are useful guides to Title IX analysis. /d. 
at 442. But see Sasha Ransom, Comment, How Far Is Too Far? Balancing Sexual 
Harassment Policies and Reasonableness in the Primary and Secondary Classrooms, 
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What little can be gleaned from the reported Title IX cases is that the 
harassment must be motivated by the victim's gender-on "the basis of 
sex"-albeit not just "because of sex."85 When it comes to judging 
students' conduct on the basis of gender, courts will obviou~ly view 
behavior with overt sexual overtones as actionable misconduct; such as 
rape, fondling, other forms of molestation, lewd remarks and acts, 
sexually oriented touching, and even challenges to gender roles of 
masculinity. Such behavior picks out a particular gender because of that 
gender, not just because of sexuality.86 The individual markers of bad 
conduct-severe, pervasive, objectively offensive-are also provable by 
ex · · g the "constellation" of sun·ounding circumstances espoused by 
Justice O'Connor in Davis ex rei. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Board 
ofEducation.81 That constellation analysis implies that any of the three 
might have unequal weight to counterbalance the others, just as Title Vll 
balances severity and pervasiveness: "[T]he more severe the conduct, the 
less pervasive it need be to be actionable. Conversely, the more pervasive 
the conduct, the less severe it need be to be actionable."88 Often, 
actionable conduct must be "extremely serious," by review of the 
"frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is 
physically threatening or h11tniliating. "89 Although evidence a victim was 
treated in a sexually subservient and demeaning fashion might be 
enough, 90 outright threatening and intimidating conduct 91 and "discrimi-
27 Sw. U. L. REV~ 265,287-93 (1997) (arguing Title VII is "not the proper analog" for 
student-on--student sexual harassment). 
85 Davis ex rei. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Bd. ofEduc., 526 U.S. 629t 651 
(1999); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75,78 (1998). Title IX 
is framed on the "basis of sex'; and Title VII is framed around ''because of sex." 
Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1994). Oncale 
identified. at least three motivations to prove sexual harassment is because of sex: sexual 
desire, hostility to one gender, and discrimination toward one· gender. 5 23 U.S. at 80-81. 
On the basis of sex is vaguer. 
86 See, e.g., Ca"oll K., 19 F. Supp. 2d at 621; see also Henson, 682 F.2d at 904 
(Title Vll). 
87 526 u.s. 629 (1999). 
88 Wilson v. S. Nat'l Bank ofN.C., Inc., 900 F. Supp. 803, 809 (W.D.N.C. 1995), 
afF d, 92 F .3d 1184 (4th Cir. 1996). 
89 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787-88 (citations omitted). 
90 Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods.-, Inc., 335 F.3d 325, 333 (4th Cir. 2003). 
91 E.g., Mann v. Lima, 290 F. Supp. 2d 190, 197-98 (D.R.I. 2003). 
264 AME~CANJOURNALOF~LADVOCACY [Vol. 29:243 
natory intimidation, ridicule, and insults"92 are usually required in peer 
sexual harassment cases, as discussed below. 
The behavior must be objectively offensive as well, and in the Title 
Vll context, that means that a reasonable person must find the behavior 
offensive,93 or the conduct must be so "objectively offensive as to alter 
the 'conditions' of the victim's employment."94 What student-plaintiffs 
must override in the school district's side of the case-perhaps by affidavit 
of an expert witness-is the notion that children cannot engage in sexual 
harassment because they do not understand the seriousness of what they 
are doing. The younger the child, the greater doubt a court might have 
about whether the victim perceives the sexual nature of the alleged 
harassment. Such slant to the evidence does not comport with the Davis 
test because the behavior must be objectively offensive; subjectivity is 
not the standard for judging peer sexual harassment under Title IX. In 
addition, that notion flies in the face oflong-standing sexual harassment 
theory that one can be harassed even if sexual relations were voluntary-if 
those relations were unwelcome.95 Thus, a special education student who 
has been raped has still been subjected to sexual harassment regardless 
ofher mental capacity. Similarly, youth and inunaturity should not shade 
the objective offensiveness of the harasser's conduct. 
Thus, a skeleton of what constitutes actionable harassment comes into 
view. Everyday pedestrian harassment and bullying will not trigger Title 
IX. 96 However, the spectrutn of evidence that would come within the 
92 E.g., Ha"is, 510 U.S. at 21 (citations omitted); see Russell v. Midwest-Werner 
& Pfleiderer, Inc., 949 F. Supp. 792, 797 (D. Kan. 1996). 
93 Ha"is, 510 U.S. at 21-22. 
94 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81; Ocheltree, 335 F .3d at 333. 
9 s "But the fact that sex-related conduct was 'voluntary,' in the sense that the 
complainant was not forced to participate against her will, is not a defense to a sexual 
harassment suit brought under Title VII. The gravamen of any sexual harassment claim 
is that the alleged sexual advances were 'unwelcome."' Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB, 477 
U.S. at 68; see also JOHN F. LEWIS & SUSAN C. HASTINGS, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN 
EDUCATION 9 (2d ed. 1994). 
96 It is a bit disconcerting that Justice Kennedy, in dissent in Davis, seems to accept 
the ''ubiquitous" nature ofbullying in schools as if it were an acceptable part of growing 
up. Davis, 526 U.S. at 677-78. "Ubiquitous" does not mean "innocuous." Bullying in 
school has its own ramifications for schools and the law that protects children under their 
supervisory care. See, e.g., Nan Stein, Bullying or Sexual Harassment? The Missing 
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meaning of severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive behavior could 
be long and broad. 
At one end of that spectrun1 is evidence like that alleged in Davis.91 
Fifth-grade LaS honda (and some ofher female classmates) were subjected 
to several months' worth of the criminal antics of G.F. that included 
offensive touching, lewd behavior, and verbal abuse.98 Similarly grim 
evidence prompted the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Vance v. 
Spencer County Public School District, to detennine that a female high-
schoolerundetwent sufficiently actionable bad conduct when she endured 
repeated verbal and physical sexual harassment beginning in sixth grade. 99 
That conduct included teasing and regular occurrences of being shoved 
into walls while other students grabbed her book bag and made off with 
her homework. 100 She was stabbed in the hand by a male student who 
referred to the female students in physical education class as "whores'' 
and "motherfuckers. " 101 Some students called her crude names while 
others grabbed at her hair and tore her shirt. 102 In still other instances, 
students fondled her breasts and buttocks and requested sexual favors. 103 
Of a similarly prolonged and pervasive nature was the ordeal in Doe 
v. Londonderry School District, during which a seventh-grade girl was 
subjected to increasingly hostile verbal assaults, threats of retaliation if 
she reported the behavior, physical contact, abusive telephone calls to her 
home, a pornographic cartoon depicting her engaged in anal sex, and 
Discourse of Rights in an Era ofZero Tolerance, 45 ARIZ. L. REv. 783 (2003); Daniel 
B. Weddle, Bullying in Schools: The Disconnect Between Empirical Research and 
Constitutional, Statutory, and Tort Duties to Supervise, 77 TEMP. L. REv. 641 (2004). 
However, bullying is an antecedent to peer sexual harassment. NAN STEIN, CLASSROOMS 
& COURTROOMS: FACING SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN K-12 SCHOOLS 49-50 (1999). 
97 526 u.s. 629. 
98 Davis, 526 U.S. at 629. 
99 231 F.3d 253, 259 (6th Cir. 2000). The Vance case actually went to trial, but the 
school district appealed from the court's denial of its motion for judgment as a matter 
of law, the post-verdict equivalent of a motion for summary judgment. 
100 /d. at 256. 
101 /d. 
102 /d. 
103 /d. at 257. 
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being hit with a piece of meat covered with a sexuallubricant. 104 Like-
wise, a young male student avoided summary judgment on evidence that, 
while he was in fifth, sixth, and seventh grades, fellow students inflicted 
a prolonged batTage of verbal abuse because ofhis stance in favor of gay 
rights. 105 He was called "little fag," "queer," "little faggy queero," and 
"little bitch" by both male and female students. 106 He was involved in 
nun1erous fights, including one occasion during which his face was 
pushed into a bus window and he was told to "'(k]iss it, you little fag. 
Kiss it. '"107 Two older students even accosted him in the bathroom and 
slammed his head into a urinal, chipping his tooth. 108 
Widespread verbal abuse got past a motion for summary judgment 
when high school basketball team members constantly harassed a pair 
ofbrothers by challenging their masculinity: they were called "Stiffy'' and 
"Little Stiffy," "fag," "homo," and "jewboy," and endured other com-
ments suggesting the boys were homosexual. 109 Further evidence of 
severe, pervasive, and offensive conduct have included teasing that 
escalated to assault and battery, 110 multiple instances of assault and bat-
tery111 that include fondling and verbal abuse, 112 sexual verbal com-
ments, 113 and multiple sexual assaults. 114 These exaznples certainly 
104 970 F. Supp. 64, 66-68 (D.N.H. 1997), modified on other grounds, 32 F. Supp. 
2d 1360 (D.N.H. 1997) (pre-Davis). 
105 Schroeder, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 871-72. 
106 /d. at 870-71. 
107 /d. at 879. 
108 I d. at 8 71. 
109 Snelling v. Fall Mountain Reg'l Sch. Dist., No. CIV. 99-448-JD, 2001 WL 
276975, at *1 (D.N.H. Mar. 21, 2001). The brothers were also subjected to physical 
abuse during the course of basketball practices, which the coaches ignored. 
110 Ray, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 1167, 1170. 
111 Ca"o/1 K., 19 F. Supp. 2d at 620-21 (pre-Davis). 
112 Haines, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 995 (pre-Davis). 
113 Jacqueline M. ex rei. Nicole M. v. Martinez Unified Sch. Dist., 964 F. Supp. 1369, 
1372 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (pre-Davis). "The harassment consisted of unwanted verbal 
comments regarding plaintitrs breasts and figure in general, and on one occasion 
involved a male student touching plaintiff's breast during class." /d. 
114 Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1243-44, 1248. 
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evidence both the pervasiveness and severity that would entitle a plaintiff 
to Title IX remedies for peer sexual harassment. 
However, at the other end of the spectrum are stories of conduct that 
are a tad more vague, that do not quite seem to prick at a court's con-
science as the preceding cases did. For instance, in Gabrielle M v. Park 
Forest-Chicago Heights; Illinois School District 163, one problematic 
. ' . 
male kindergarten student, Jason, engaged in fairly randy behavior from 
his first day in school.1 15 Jason jumped on Gabrielle's back during recess 
and leaned against her while holding his crotch, apparently habitual recess 
behavior that also included kissing his little female classmates.116 On 
more than one occasion, he unzipped his pants when the teacher was not 
looking and exposed his underpants to his classmates!'' Jason and 
another classmate were caught with their hands down each other's 
pants. 118 These specific incidents were deemed not of a sexual nature 
because the "children ... were not engaging in knowingly sexual acts, 
a fact that (at a minimum) detracts from the severity and offensiveness 
of their actions." 119 And the evidence that might have borne some sexual 
connotation was clothed in Gabrielle's kindergarten parlance, that Jason 
"bothered" her, did "nasty stuff' and wanted to spend recess time playing 
liS 315 F!3d 817, 818-19 (7th Cir. 2003). 
116 Gabrielle M, 315 F.3d at 818-19. 
117 /d. at 819. 
118 /d. 
119 /d. at 822-23. But see Borrero v. Collins Bldg. Servs., Inc., No. 01 Civ. 6885 
(AGS), 2002 WL 31415511 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2002) (sbnilarbehaviorwas objectively 
and subjectively offensive under Title VII). 'When dealing with very young children, 
at least one court ruled that vague allegations of similar behavior did not reach the level 
ofproofnecessary foractionable sexual harassment because the children were "unaware" 
of the sexual nature of the conduct. Gabrielle M., 315 F .3d at 823. 'l'his conclusion 
was premised upon the evidence of the school psychologist and should prompt the good 
litigatQr to prepare one's own expert and challenge the relevance of such evidence. The 
test is not whether the children believed they were engaging in sexual behavior; the test 
is whether the objective observer would think so. One of the strictures of Davis is that 
the children's subjective concerns about the behavior are not at issue when they must 
be "objectively offensive." See Davis ex rei. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Bd. of 
Educ., 526 U.S. 629 ( 1999). Furthetinore, the te.rtns often used by elementary students 
for gender bullying behavior will sound more likerun-of-the ... mill bullying behavior than 
sexual harassment. The latter concepts do not compute, although ''pestering,'' "annoy-
ing," "bothering," "hassling," and ''bugging" might. STEIN, supra note 96, at 61-.62. 
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with her in '' funny ways." 120 This evidence was too vague and unspecific 
to defeat the school district's motion for summary judgment.121 
Similar acts of prolonged and pervasive teasing, nattle-calling, and 
general botherment between seven-year-olds are not enough to constitute 
severe, pervasive, and objectionably offensive sexual harassment 
conduct. 122 And lest one suspect that problems-of proof occur only with 
younger children, the same resulted at the secondary level when male high 
school students called a female student ''slut," "bitch,'' and "puss[y]."123 
This verbal harassment was not deemed sexual harassment because, 
according to the court, it occurred duringthe course of a running dispute 
fueled by personal animus, not sex. 124 Even an incident of oral and anal 
sex upon a special education student was not sufficiently egregious 
conduct because there was no proofofpervasive gender-related harass-
ment, despite a history of teasing and bullying.125 Thus, the other end of 
the spectrum seems inhabited by behavior that might be classified as more 
innocuous teasing or incidents that courts believe are unrelated. to sex. 
Plaintiffs evidence might fit within an exception to the mere teasing 
end of the spectrum if it were prolonged and systemic. Evidence of a 
long-term pattern ofname-calling, teasing, and crude sexual gestures was 
sufficient to survive summary judgment in Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified 
School District No. 464. 126 The harassment took place over a four-year 
period, and 
120 Gabrielle M, 315 F.3d at 822. 
121 /d . 
.. 
22 Manfredi v. Mount Vernon Bd. ofEduc., 94 F. Supp. 2d 447, 454 (S.D.N~Y. 
2000). The court left unresolved whether a single incident of the harasser's having put 
his hand between the victim's legs and briefly touching her v:agina was sufficient, as it 
would be in the workplace. /d. at 454-55. 
123 Burwell v. Pekin Cmty. HighSch.Dist No.303, 213 F. Supp. 2d 917,919 (C.D. 
Ill. 2002). 
124 /d. at 930-931. "Damages are not available for simple acts of teasing and natne-
calling among school children, however, even where these comments target differences 
in gender." /d. at 931. (emphasis in original). 
125 Wilson v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist, 144 .F. Supp. 2d 690,691,694 (E.D. Tex. 
2001). 
126 377 F. Supp. 2d 952, 977 (D. Kan. 2005) (Theno 1). 
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the bulk of the more severe harassment traced its origins back to the rumor 
that began when plaintiff was in seventh grade that he was caught rnasturbat-
ing in the bathroom. The fact that plaintiffs peers made crude drawings and 
teased him because he was perceived to be a masturbator, when combined 
with arguably related crude name-calling, reflects that plaintiffs harassers 
believed that he did not conform to male stereotypes by not engaging in such 
behavior at school, i.e., that he did not act as a man should act 127 
Whether this case was the exception because it involved a male student 
rather than a female student remains to be tested. 
Obviously, the more evidence of sexually charged behavior that is 
available, the better it is for the plaintiff. That is not to say that a lesser 
level of proof might not win out; however, as school districts continue 
to challenge all aspects of the prima facie peer sexual harassment case, 
plaintiffs counsel is best served by accumulating as much evidence as 
possible for the eventual and dreaded motion for sutnmary judgment. Of 
some help is the conjunction of the nature of the conduct with its related 
element, its effect on the victim. 
Under Title IX, sexually harassing behavior must have a "systemic 
effect of denying the victim equal access to an educational program or 
activity. " 128 This element is obviously related to Title Vll analysis in 
which the behavior "must be extreme to atnount to a change in the terms 
and conditions of employment."129 However, student-on-student sexual 
127 Theno /, 3 77 F. Supp. 2d at 965 (emphasis in original); see also Doe ex rel. Doe 
v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560 {N.D. Cal. 1993), reconsideration 
granted by949 F. Supp. 1415 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (pre-Davis). In the Petaluma case, the 
plaintiff was subjected to sexually charged verbal abuse throughout seventh and eighth 
grade and alleged facts sufficient to suggest to the court that she might have a case for 
hostile environment sexual harassment. Beginning with the innocuous statement, "I hear 
you have a hot dog in your pants," rumors spread by both male and female students about 
the plaintiff's having had sex with a hot dog. Classmates started to call her "hot dog 
bitch," "slut" and "ho" and wrote comments on the bathroom walls every day, such as 
"Jane is a hot dog bitch." /d. at 1564-66; see also Sarah Diane Stevenson, The Revenge 
of the Hot Dog Slut.4 Peer Harassment After Davis v. Monroe, 10 S. CAL. REv. L. & 
WOMEN'S STUD. 137 (2000). 
128 Davis, 526 U.S. at 652. 
129 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998). Similarly, the Court 
has defmed actionable sexual harassment under Title VII as being "sufficiently severe 
or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of[the victim's] employment and create an abusive 
working environrnent. ,, Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB, 477 U.S. at 67. 
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harassment takes a somewhat narrower view of the end result. Such a 
narrow view might be the result of the Court's failing to inquire whether 
the victim subjectively believed she was being harassed. The view-might 
. . 
also be narrowed because of the Court's perspective that peer sexual 
harassment is "less likely'' to deny equal access opportunities than 
teacher-on-student sexual harassment. t.lo 
Perhaps because of the specialized school environment, the Court 
might have felt constrained in deciding what evidence did or did not 
constitute a denial of equal access to educational opportunity. Whatever 
the reason, the evidentiary burden. for this element is pretty v.ague in 
Davis. Outright deprivation ofphysical access to educational opportuni-
ties is not required, but further direction is lacking. 131 The problem thus 
becomes .determining what evidence will prove that the severity and 
pervasiveness of the harassment undermined and detracted from the 
educational experience.132 Evidence of a mere drop in grades may not 
be enough to stave off a motion for sumntary judgment on this element, 
but Justice 0 'Connor does not foreclose victory if that evidence combines 
with the persistence and .severity of the actionable conduct itself. 133 
Whatever the source, the impact should have a "concrete, negative effect 
on [the victim's] ability to receive an education''134 in line with the theme 
of educational equality contained in Title IX; the victim must show a 
distinct connection between the behavior and the resultant problems in 
school. One might suggest that this element is the equivalent of the Title-
Vll analysis of the subjective perception of the victim, especially for those 
students who cannot articulate a sexual aspect to the harassment. 
Obviously, a motion .for summary judgment will have a greater 
likelihood of success when the effect of the harassment is worse. For 
example, in Manfredi v. Mount Vernon Board of Education, a second-
grader did not provide adequate evidence that she suffered adverse effects 
130 Davis, 526 U.S. at 653. 
131 See id. at 651. 
132 . • . See 1d. at 650-5 1. 
133 See id. at 652. Grades are the work-product for this workplace of public school 
students. Students usually do notview a drop in grades as being mere~ Too much rides 
on academic success to be cavalier about grades in this manner. 
134 /d. at 654. 
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from a classmate's sexual harassment when she passed all her courses 
and could not connect her absences to the alleged harassment. 135 Panic 
attacks that could not be directly linked to the offensive conduct were not 
of sufficiently deleterious effect when the alleged victim satisfactorily 
completed her exa1ns and was elected student of the month. 136 The case 
ofHawkins v. Sarasota County School Board held that none ofthe alleged 
victims were denied equal access to educational opportunity when they 
suffered no decline in grades and suffered no observable behavioral 
changes.137 Such evidence may not be enough to avoid summary 
judgment. 138 
In contrast, evidence of a denial of access to education seems directly 
linked to the pervasiveness of the harassing conduct such that proof of 
one is proof of the other: the more the better. For instance, Alma 
McGowen was subjected to numerous physical and verbal attacks that 
resulted in her being diagnosed with depression and settling for being 
schooled at home..l39 Similarly, Jesse Montgomery experienced systemic 
problems with same-sex sexual harassment that deprived him of physical 
access to the educational programs when, for years, he feared using the 
school's restroom and "avoided eating in the cafeteria, riding the school 
bus, orparticipating:in intramural sports._''140 Although his grades did not 
particularly suffer,-the district court determined that the activities from 
which he felt excluded were benefits of the educational program, and he 
thereby experienced substantial interference with his education. 141 For 
us 94 F. Supp. 2d at 45 5. In addition, she had not met with a psychologist until after 
her mother had retained counsel. /d. at 451-52.-Similarly, Gabrielle M. did not "suffer~" 
Although Gabrielle was diagnosed with some psychological problems, her grades 
re-mained steady and she did not experience serious absenteeism. See Gabrielle M .. , 31 S 
F.3d at 823. 
136 See Johnson v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No~ 47, 194 F. Supp. 2d 939, 946 (D. Minn. 
2002)t . 
137 322 F. 3d at 1289. 
138 Although the victims asserted they ·were upset, they did not report the problems 
to their parents until several months later. See id. Their absences from school were 
deterrnined to have no probative value when two had faked illness to avoid going to 
school for four or five days. See id. 
139 Vance, 231 F.3d at 257, 259. 
140 Montgomery, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 1094. 
141 /d. 
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two brothers, summary judgment was granted when widespread sexual 
harassment by fellow students and some coaches went "far beyond" 
teasing. 142 Another victim was "totally deprived" of educational benefits 
by the actionable sexual harassment of a fellow student when she becarne 
suicidal and engaged in self-destructive behavior, causing her to be 
institutionalized and later home-bound. 143 Therefore, proof of physical 
school avoidance is clearly useful when added to the psychological 
reactions. 
However, an adverse psychological reaction may be enough as a 
measure of the victim's subjective reaction. A demonstration of such 
psychological trautna sufficient to deny a student access to educational 
opportunities was the subject in Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified School 
District No. 464.144 In Theno, the victim was torttlented for four years 
by his fellow students, routinely called "fag," "faggot," "jack-offboy," 
''banana boy," "queer," "flatner," or "masturbator." 145 He was the subject 
of crude drawings and conunents that reinforced the belief that he was 
gay. 146 As a result of this continuous and unrelenting torment, he suffered 
stomach problems and depression that required medication and counsel-
ing.147 He was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety 
disorder, and avoidant personality disorder, and he eventually left 
school. 148 The school district's motion for summary judgment on this 
issue was denied, 149 and the plaintiff eventually won a $250,000 verdict 
against the school district. 
If any trend can be found in these cases, it is the overwhelming 
magnitude of the evidence that a plaintiff must bring to a motion for 
142 Snelling, 2001 WL 276975, at *5. 
143 Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1244, 1248-49. 
144 377 F. Supp. 2d 952, 968 (D. Kan. 2005) (Theno 1). 
14s Theno I, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 968. 
146 /d. at 965, 968. 
147 /d. at 968. 
148 /d. 
• 
149 /d. at976; Thenov. Tonganoxie UnifiedSch. Dist. No. 464,394 F. Supp. 2d 1299 
(D. Kan. 2005) (Theno II). But see Burwell, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 931-32 (female student 
diagnosed with post-traumatic stress syndrome was not denied educational opportunities 
when she achieved her highest grades in high school during the problematic semester). 
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sunnnary judgment for both elements. To create a genuine issue of 
material fa.ct about the harassing conduct, a victim usually must prove 
more than a single incident. That evidence can be other than just 
sexually-oriented behavior; it can also be teasing and pervasive harass-
ment targeted at a particular gender. Also, in line with these cases, a 
plaintiff should show some quantitative psychological harn1, especially 
in the absence of de facto physical exclusion from the educational 
program. Although one would think that any child's aversion to school 
caused by fear would be actionable, some cases suggest otherwise. 
Something more than just being afraid of one's everyday envirorunent 
is required. Such judicial attitude ignores the fact that these students are 
''twice-victimized": they are victims ofharassing behavior and of a denial 
of "their rights to a quality education in a tranquil learning environ-
ment. " 150 Unless and until some plaintiff can create that theme in a Title 
IX peer sexual harassment case, which is not unlike the hostile environ-
ment that is actionable under Title Vll, children are going to have a much 
harder time showing how they have suffered in their own workplace, 
especially in the absence of a clearly articulated, objective test of the 
harassment. 
B. See No Evil, Hear No Evil: Actual Knowledge 
This next element of the Title IX peer sexual harassment test involves 
a much simpler task. Who knew what, and when did he know it? Davis 
is not terribly enlightening in the matter of the school district's "actual 
knowledge" or its response to uknown acts of sexual harassment."151 
Indeed, the school district's knowledge was not at issue in Davis. How-
ever, according to Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 152 
actual knowledge is the ultimate hook that makes a school district liable 
under Title IX and not of mere vicarious liability that might otherwise 
arise from an employment situation or some other type of custodial 
150 See SHOOP & EDWARDS, supra note 66, at 109. 
tst See, e.g., Joan E. Schaffner, Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education: The 
Unresolved Questions, 21 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 79) 87-90 (2000). 
ISl 524 U.S. 274, 288 (1998). 
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control-agency relationship that creates liability for student-on-student 
sexual harassment. 153 
Also unlike the Gebser decision, Davis does not instruct that actual 
knowledge must be possessed by a school district official with authority 
to take corrective action. 154 That distinction is likely because, when 
dealing with the custodial-control aspect of a school district, almost any 
school official, whether teacher, adtninistrator, or school board member, 
ostensibly has the supervisory power to take the corrective action 
necessary between and a1nong students to keep from being deliberately 
indifferent. tss At the very least, proof must show that the victim advised 
at least one of these categories of officials because their actions likely can 
be attributed to the statutory recipient of federal funds for Title IX 
liability_l56 This custodial control arises because schools are typically 
charged with a duty of supervision.157 The supervisory requirement can 
vary by the age of the children158 and be heightened by knowledge of 
dangerous conditions in the school.159 Therefore, if a victim wants to 
assure that someone in authority has actual knowledge, that individual 
will likely need to possess "the authority to halt known abuse, perhaps 
by measures such as transferring the harassing student to a different class, 
suspending hirn, curtailing his privileges, or providing additional supervi-
sion."160 
Such direct knowledge might be derived from school officials' actual 
observation, students' formal and infotmal reports, and from bystanders' 
1
s3 See Davis, 526 U.S. at 644-48. 
154 See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 289-90. 
' 
•ss This differs from teacher-on-student harassment where the notified official must 
have authority over the harassing teacher. 
156 See, e.g., Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1247; Schaffner, supra note 151, at 87-88. 
157 See, e.g., Miller v. Griesel, 308 N.E.2d 701, 706-07 (Ind. 1974); Sheehan v. St. 
Peter's Catholic Sch., 188 N.W.2d 868, 870 (Minn. 1971); see also Davis, 526 U.S. 
at 644. 
138 See, e.g., Johnson ex rei. Johnson v. Sch. Dist. ofMillard, 573 N.W .2d. 116, 119 
(Neb. 1998). 
159 See, e.g., Dixon v. Chi. Bd. ofEduc., 710 N.E.2d 112, 116 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999); 
Johnson v. City ofBoston, 490 N.E.2d 1204, 1206-07 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986). 
160 Mu"ell, 186 F.3d at 1247; see also Snelling, 2001 WL 276975, at *5 . 
• 
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reports. 161 The very nature of the educational environment suggests that 
notice can be transmitted in any number of ways in order to be found 
acceptable. 162 Schools must be flexible, particularly because children are 
less likely than employees to tell a school authority figure they have been 
sexually harassed. Instead, children are more likely to tell a friend or 
familymember. 163 Although one decision determined that mere observa-
tion is not enough without a particular report, 164 the required supervisory 
duties of school officials suggest that seeing is believing. Even though 
actionable peer sexual harassment does not have an explicit subjective 
component, school observers must use their objective antennae when 
confronted with untoward behavior that the victim is not enjoying. 165 
Combining students' itmnaturitywith their innate fear of school adminis-
trators, teacher observers are the front-line of protection. Accordingly, 
a school district's motion to dismiss was denied on the strength of 
evidence that a teacher witnessed a playground incident that amounted 
to sexual harassment, because the teacher had supervisory authority at 
the time and failed to intervene.166 But a teacher's knowledge of 
nonspecific and generally problematic misconduct may not be actual 
knowledge of sexual harassment. 167 
161 Davies, supra note 32, at 423. 
162 See id. 
163 AM.Ass'NoFUNIVERSITYWOMENEoucATIONALFOUNDATION,HosTILEHALL-
wAvs: BULLYING, TEASING, AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN SCHOOL 29-30 (2001), 
available at http://www .aauw .orglmember _ center/publications!HostileHallwayslhostile 
hallways. pdf [hereinafter 2001 HOSTILE HALLW A vs]. Only 11% ofboth physically and 
non-physically harassed students were likely to tell a teacher, while 9% were likely to 
tell another school employee. /d. 
164 See Winzer v. Sch. Dist. of Pontiac, 105 F. App'x 679, 681 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(principal aware that middle school students were engaging in sexual activity on school 
grounds but did not know that it was not consensual; therefore he had no actual notice 
of sexual harassment); see also Harris & Grooms, supra note 76, at 608-09. 
16
' See Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified Sch. Dist. No. 464,394 F. Supp. 2d 1299 (D. 
Kan. 2005). But see Gabrielle M., 315 F.3d at 823 (finding that near constant super-
vision of kindergartners is insufficient to constitute actual knowledge of harassment 
unless observation of actual sexual harassment occurs). 
166 Carroll K., 19 F. Supp. 2d at 621-22; see also Mu"ell, 186 F.3d at 1248. 
167 Gabrielle M., 315 F.3d at 823-24. 
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The safest route to recovery is for the victim to have informed a school 
administrator, and not just a teacher, of the acts ofharassment. 168- This 
notice should have sufficient specificity so that the school district can 
actually take action. 169 In these cases, a victim's parent typically calls a 
school principal to discuss the harassment, 170 makes repeated reports to 
the teachers and the principal, 171 calls the principal and the superin-
tendent, 172 or calls the principal and the assistant principal. 173. A victim-
litigant who has not reported the harassment at all or cannot otherwise 
prove that school officials had actual knowledge of the conduct to do 
something _about it likely will not prevaiL Reb·uilding the chronology 
would be useful, and the higher the reports went the better. Some severe 
and pervasive conduct might be sufficiently reported if teachers or 
administrators actually observed the behavior. However, the best 
evidence remains a recounting and chronology of the victim's and her 
parents' reports to both. 
C. Do No Evil: Deliber-ate Indifference 
Oddly enough, proving deliberate indifference has been problematic 
in getting past a motion for summary judgment due in no small measure 
to the great deference courts traditionally bestow on school districts' 
policy actions. "Courts should refrain from second-guessing the 
168 Schaffner, supra note 151, at 90. "By requiring that the 'appropriate person' be 
an 'official' and by· requiring that that person have at a 'minimum'· authority to institute 
corrective measures, it is more likely that the Davis Court intended that the principal 
have actual notice of peer sexual harassment before liability under Title IX may be 
unposed upon the recipient." /d. (citation omitted). 
169 See Harris & Grooms, supra note 76, at 607-08. 
170 Mun"e/1, 186 F.3d at 1247-48. 
171 Vance, 231 F.3d at 259; see also Morlock v. W. Cent. Educ. Dist., 46 F. Supp. 
2d. 892,908-09 (D. Minn. 1999) (pre-Davis) (attributing actual knowledge to teacher, 
technical tutor, and the Title IX coordinator, a building principal "equivalent" in special 
education district). 
172 Snelling, 2001 WL 276975, at *6. 
173 Schroeder, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 880. School board members likely do not have 
to have actual knowledge. !d. But see Rasnick, 333 F. Supp. 2d at 564 (holding that 
the school board is not liable under Title IX because the division superintendent lacked 
authority to take action on behalf of the school board against the harassing teacher). 
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disciplinary decisions made by school adt11inistrators. "174 This deference 
arises from the power given to local school boards to control and manage 
the affairs of local education. 175 Thus, prevailing at the sununary judg-
ment level on this element can be difficult for victim-litigants because 
of schools' discretion in matters of discipline and management. 
Deliberate indifference seems to be the other hook for Title IX liability 
under the contractual theory set out in Gebser. In response to known 
teacher-on-student sexual harassment, a school district's deliberate 
indifference must amount to an official decision not to remedy a Title IX 
violation. 176 Although Davis is not especially illuminating on the 
matter, 177 peer sexual harassment prompts a somewhat lower standard of 
care. A school district is not charged with · g to eradicate peer 
harassment by implementing preventive codes of conduct. It will be held 
liable ''where the [school's] response to the harassment or lack thereof 
is clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances."178 That 
might mean more than recklessness but is at least a failure to act in the 
face of certain or substantial certainty of student hatm. 179 It clearly means 
174 Davis, 526 U.S. at 648 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. 325, 342-43 n.9 
(1985)). 
17
' Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26, 451 U.S. at 863-64. 
But that is a double-edged sword: schools are charged with teaching "the shared values 
of a civilized social order, so they have the power to limit certain offensive student 
conduct that might otherwise be constitutionally protected. Bethel Scb. Dist. No. 403 
v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675', 683-84 (1986) (stating that a school has the authority to limit 
and/or discipline the use of lewd, wlgar, and offensive language). Those limits of this 
special educational environment are vaguely defmed as those that are "reasonably related 
to legitimate pedagogical concerns." Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 273. With that 
power and responsibility, does not a school district have a concomitant, heightened 
responsibility to teach such "civilized social order" when local school employees have 
actual knowledge of peer sexual harassment? Perhaps not. School-initiated decisions 
limiting students' freedoms seem to be given greater deference than school failures to 
protect their students. · 
176 Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290. 
tn Schaffner, supra note 151, at 90 (stating that it remains unclear from Davis 
"whether notice of peer sexual harassment to an individual teacher satisfies the Gebser 
standard," that is, whether an individual teacher is an official with authority to address 
and correct the harassment); see generally Harris & Grooms, supra note 76, at 612. 
178 Davis, 526 U.S. at 648. 
179 The Sixth Circuit approved the following language in the jury instructions given 
in Vance: 
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something more than just an explicit institutional decision to ignore 
harassment180 but might impose something less than the duty of an 
employer to its employee. 181 
Evidence ofdeliberate indifference to overcome a motion for sununary 
judgment is not evidence of intent to discriminate but rather evidence that 
proves causation ofharassment182 and appears to have the following three 
stages. (1) Did the school investigate properly? (2) If it did investigate, 
did it implement remediation? (3) If it did remediate, was it effective?183 
Therefore, this evidence has the flavor of causation in it. To be held 
liable, what did the school fail to do that promoted a violation of its Title 
IX duties?184 The focus then is detennining when a school's response is 
clearly unreasonable. 
As for the first two rhetorical questions, an official response necessar-
ily starts with the Department of Education's Sexual Harassment 
Guidance. 185 This requires that, 
"Deliberate Indifference" means more than mere "recklessness" on the part of the 
appropriate person. "Recklessness" requires only proof that a reasonable person 
would have appreciated the great degree of risk of haran to the plaintiff. In order 
for an act to be "deliberate," the particular appropriate person must have been shown 
to have been aware that adverse consequences from his or her action were certain 
or substantially certain to cause the hann. Before you can find that any appropriate 
person was deliberately indifferent, the plaintiff must prove that the appropriate 
person was aware that a particular act or inaction was certain or substantially certain 
to cause the Plaintiff harm and that the appropriate person decided to act or not to 
act in spite of that knowledge. 
231 F .3d at 263-64. 
180 See Davies, supra note 32, at 427-31. 
181 Deborah L. Brake, School Liability for Peer Sexual Harassment After Davis: 
Shifting from Intent to Causation in Discrimination Law, 12 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 
5, 25-29 (2001). 
182 /d. at 22-23. 
183 See generally Harris & Grooms, supra note 76, at 612-16 (discussing the "deliber-
ate indifference" concept). 
184 
"[T]he implicit theory of discrimination underlying the Davis decision [is] that 
schools cause the discrimination by exacerbating the harn1 that results from sexual 
harassment by students." Brake, supra note 181, at 6. 
185 OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, DEP 'T OF EDUCATION, REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR 
THIRD PARTIES {200 1 ), available at http:/ /www.ed.gov/offices/OCR/archiveslshguide/ 
index.html [hereinafter REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE]. 
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[ o ]nee a school has notice of possible sexual harassment of students ... it 
should take immediate and appropriate steps to investigate or otherwise 
detennine what occurred and take prompt and effective steps reasonably 
calculated to end any harassment, eliminate a hostile environment if one has 
been created, and prevent harassment from occurring again.186 
In illustration, a principal's failure to investigate allegations of sexual 
harassment is deliberate indifference. 187 Likewise, a principal and 
assistant principal who did nothing after a report of sexual harassment 
"fostered an environment in which such harassment was accepted, and 
which made [the victim] more vulnerable to further harassment."188 In 
another case, a principal not only did not investigate the victims' com-
plaints, he told one victim that the nicknames and physical abuse that he 
endured were "a part of growing up and should be tolerated. "189 Similar 
indifference was exhibited by teachers who had actual knowledge of the 
alleged harassment and attempted to conceal it by advising the disabled 
victim not to tell her mother. 190 Thus, lack of investigation and failure 
to implement any remedy are the frrst avenues of proof for the victim. 
The third question examines post-investigation remediation. A court 
will also measure the efficacy of the remedy; doing something is not 
enough. "[W]here a school district has knowledge that its remedial action 
is inadequate and ineffective, it is required to take reasonable action in 
light of those circutnstances to eliminate the behavior."191 Merely talking 
to the offending students without any further discipline or reports to law 
enforcement of physical abuse may be deliberate indifference in continu-
ing to employ obviously ineffective methods to stop unrelenting harass-
186 !d. at 1 5-16. The Department ofEducation has recommended investigations since 
the issuance of its 1997 version of the Guidance. Harris & Grooms, supra note 76, at 
615-16 (citations omitted). The victim must also cooperate with the investigation. See 
Johnson, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 947-48. 
187 Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1248. 
188 Schroeder, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 880. 
189 Snelling, 2001 WL 276975, at *6. Even after the victims' parents met with the 
superintendent, and the superintendent issued an action memo to the principal, the 
principal did nothing. !d. at •6-7. 
190 Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1248. 
191 Vance, 231 F.3d at 261. 
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rnent. 192 Likewise, doing too little of more substantial disciplinary 
measures may also be deliberate indifference. Even though a school took 
some steps to stop the harassment by suspending and expelling some 
offending students, the evidence revealed that the harassment was "open, 
recurring, and frequently tolerated'' by school officials. The evidence also 
revealed that school officials told the victim that nothing could be done 
and advised her to tolerate it. This incomplete remedy was deliberate 
indifference in the face of pervasive sexual harassment.193 Thus, school 
district liability may still accrue if individual disciplinary actions are not 
enough to stop the hostile environment experienced by a victim.194 
The school district;s remedy to overcome the deliberate indifference 
hurdle must be related to the severity of the harassment. For example, 
a school district did not display deliberate indifference when its ·remedy 
for unremitting teasing included "counseling [the victim], me·eting with 
the offending students, sending letters to parents, threatening suspension, 
and alerting teachers to the problem."195 Further evidence of a lack of 
deliberate indifference might include meting out discipline after each 
event and taking similar steps to prevent future harassment. In one such 
case, the school disciplined a harassing kindergartner with suspension 
from recess privileges, detention, transfer to another classroom, isolation, 
and an adjustment of lunchroom schedules to separate him from the 
victims. The school called the parents, and the school psychologist met 
with the students. Eventually, the alleged victim was allowed to transfer 
192 /d. at 262. Indeed, the ~'talking-to" method only increased the harassment. /d. 
193 Morlock, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 909-10. See also Montgomery v. Independent School 
District No. 709, where modest action by the school administration was not enough 
remediation for a ten·yearpattem ofharassment. 109 F. Supp. 2d at 1095. The victim 
alleged that he had made "hundreds of complaints about the harassment to school 
teachers, cafeteria and playground monitors, <bus drivers, principals, assistant principals, 
locker room attendants, counselors, and even the superintendent." /d. The evidence 
on summary judgment indicated that other than verbal reprimands or sending a harasser 
out to the hall, not much else was done to stop the harassment. By the time the victim 
finally filed a formal complaint, the school suspended several of the offending students 
but not the most egregious offenders. I d. at 1086. 
194 E.g., Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified Sch. Dist. No. 464, 394 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 
1311 (D. Kan. 2005); Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified Sch. Dist. No. 464, 377 F. Supp. 
2d 9'52, 976-77 (D. Kan. 2005) 
19
' Biggs v. Bd. ofEduc. of Cecil County, Md., 229 F. Supp. 2d 437,445 (D. Md. 
2002). 
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to avoid any contact even during recess. 196 These acts were not clearly 
unreasonable responses to the problem, and there was no deliberate 
indifference. 197 
The insunnountable evidence for a victim in a p.eer harassment case 
is a school district's systemic response to a problem. A school administra~ 
tion that has made a concerted effort to change the environment itself may 
prevail on sununary judgment even if the victim claims the response was 
not 100% perfect.198 Evidence of response to the systemic problem might 
include not just watning students but also counseling and suspending 
offenders, circulating memoranda to faculty and staff to prevent further 
·harassment ofthe victim, training faculty and staff, and creating school-
sponsored ass.emblies and policies to address peer harassment. 199 
Victim-litigants must understand that no court is likely to detertnine 
they are entitled to the perfect remedy, particularly in light of the 
harassing student's own rights. 200 Separating and giving the students a 
"talking-to" (rather than expulsion) may be a sufficiently reasonable 
response when a male student is annoying a female student.201 Indeed; 
not every complaint may even require. an investigation if the school 
officials doubt the report's credibility, especially if the school administra-
tors actually follow up with the accused .students and warn them off.202 
The foregoing analysis should warn plaintiffs counsel that this last 
element in the prima facie case is the most deceptively difficult to 
196 Gabri~lle M., 315 F.3d at 820. 
197 /d. at 823-25. 
198 Doe v. Bellefonte Area Sch. Dist., 106 F. App'x 798, 799-800 (3d Cir. 2004). 
199 /d. at 800. Several systemic prevention prograuts and curricular guides are 
available. See, e.g., JUDITH BERMAN BRANDENBURG, CONFRONTING SEXUAL HARASS-
MENT: WHAT SCHOOLS & COLLEGES CAN DO 66-96 ( 1997); SHOOP & EDWARDS, supra 
note 66, at 141-59, 173-239. 
200 . • . . . . . . . . • See Davzs, 526 U.S. at 649; see .also Johnson, 194 F. Supp. 2d .at 94 7; Sonano 
ex rel. Garcia v. Bd. ofEduc. ofN.Y., 2004 WL 2397610, at •4-5 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). 
. 
201 Cubie, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 1203 (holding that a business college did not actwith 
deliberate indifference in a matter of a male student paying unwanted attention to a 
female student, and the female student was not entitled to the male student's expulsion 
when the college administration met with the male student and discussed the female 
student's concerns, notified instructors of the problem, and coordinated class breaks so 
the students would not be in contact with each other). 
202 Burwell, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 933-34. 
282 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRIAL ADVOCACY [Vol. 29:243 
overcome on summaryjudgment. The challenge is the deference a court 
is likely to give a school district in matters of discipline. To the extent 
that the school district's proof in opposition is overborne by the weight 
ofthe victim's subjective psychological and physical alienation from the 
educational environment, the deliberate indifference standard might be 
tlJmed on a school district: too little is not good enough. However, all 
four of these elements clearly are affected by the special environment in 
which the harassment takes place. 
III. Educating the Litigator: 
Title IX and the School Environment 
In any education case, a couple of truisms stand out. The first truism 
was addressed in the Introduction: public schools are a unique environ~ 
ment. Unfottunately, many lawyers taking on such cases are woefully 
ignorant of that environment, often to their own chagrin and school board 
counsel's glee. School litigation reflects this special environment both 
for its very existence and by reason of case law that has developed during 
the past century. That environment is special because of the nature of the 
business an,d the age of the clientele, and even conventional tort and civil 
rights theories must be molded to acconm1odate that environment. As 
a consequence, any successful party to a Title IX peer sexual harassment 
case prevails because of a conjunction of greater knowledge of that 
environment and, to a lesser extent, the court's lack of that knowledge 
and therefore inherent deference to the party exhibiting the greater 
expertise. 
The second truism is that defense counsel for the schools, whether 
insurance or school board counsel, often have significantly more 
experience in this specialized area oflitigation than plaintiff lawyers, even 
if they specialize in tort or civil rights litigation. Even if they have not 
actually tried that many cases under Title IX, school <board lawyers are 
more fluent in the lingo and more attuned to the specialized constitutional 
issues than plaintiff lawyers. Furthermore, they have a great support 
network in the National School Boards Association; this is the environ-
ment in which school board lawyers make their living. Plaintiff lawyers, 
on the other <hand, are often engaged in a one-off case in an area fraught 
with problems they have not bothered to educate themselves about. That 
is a mistake. 
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There are at least five specific areas to which counsel in these Title 
IX cases must be attuned. The first two areas were addressed at length 
in Parts I and IT: The frrst is that the bounds for a plaintiffs succeeding 
in a peer sexual harassment case are extremely naiTOW, making it difficult 
to win. Second, these cases are usually challenged right out of the box, 
requiring a plaintiff to be fully and immediately prepared for the inevita-
ble motion for S11mmary judgment. That leads to the other three crucial 
areas to which counsel should be attentive: (a) understanding the school 
environment vis a vis student sexual harassment, (b) und.erstanding the 
dynamics of childhood and adolescent sexuality and gender identity and 
how they relate to Title IX litigation, and (c) creating litigation themes 
for casting a plaintiffs case in the best light. 
A. The Horse that Has Left the Barn: The School 
Environment and Peer Sexual Harassment 
Regardless of whether a court has faced a Title IX peer sexual harass-
ment case before, it must be convinced that it is not a new problem-a 
difficult problem perhaps but not a novel one. Title IX's prohibition 
against sex discrimination in educational pro receiving federal funds 
has been in place since 1972.203 Granted, private causes of action under 
Title IX for sexual harassment have a much shorter pedigree, only show-
ing up in federal courts around the mid-1990s 204 and finally receiving the 
Supreme Court's imprimatur in 1998 with Gebser and the recognition 
of a right of action for teacher-on-student sexual harassment.205 Just a 
year later, the Court recognized peer sexual harassment causes of action 
in Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Board of Education.206 
However, the United States Department of Education's Office of Civil 
Rights (OCR) was on the ball and issued its Sexual Harassment Guidance 
203 Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U .S.C. § 1681. 
204 See, e.g., Doe v . . Londonderry Sch. Dist., 970 F. Supp. 64, 74 (D.N.H. 1997); 
Burrow ex rei. Burrow v. Postville Cmty. Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193, 1199 (N.D. 
Iowa 1996). 
205 Gebser, 524 U.S. at 285. 
2~ . . 526 u.s. 629, 633 (1999). 
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in 1997207 and revised Guidance in 2001 to acknowledge Gebser and 
Davis.208 Thus, school districts have been on official notice of the prob-
lems and were given strategies for coping with them nearly ten years ago. 
Furthettttore, the upsurge in litigation has put them on notice that the 
school itself as a hostile environment is the entity on trial, especially in 
peer sexual harassment cases. 
The OCR Guidance is now an integral part of this special and protected 
school environment and therefore of the culture that school districts must 
enhance to comply with Title IX in matters of sexual harassment. 
Whether school districts have or will comply with the Guidance may be 
up for debate, but they now have a detailed roadmap that the OCR states 
it will follow when investigating school districts' Title IX compliance 
and approving or withholding federal funding.209 The Guidance details 
the legal structure for Title IX compliance responsibilities. It also details 
the OCR's sense of what constitutes student sexual harassment and how 
school districts should respond to complaints. Among the requirements 
is that schools have a grievance procedure in place to deal with Title IX 
complaints generally. The OCR urges school districts to apply this sarne 
grievance procedure to sexual harassment complaints.210 Although the 
Gebser Court determined that the failure to have such a policy did not 
establish the actual knowledge and deliberate indifference elements of 
a sexual harassment claim,211 the passage of time and intervening cases 
may recormnend that such failure is no longer excusable and constitutes 
evidence of a hostile school environment. 212 
School districts now know that they bear some responsibility for the 
environment in their schools.213 Supreme Court precedent is clear that 
207 Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. 12034 (March 13, 1997), available 
at http:/ /www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/sexharO l.html. 
208 REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 185, at ii. 
209 /d. at i. 
210 I d. at 19-21. 
211 Gebser, 524 U.S. at 291-92. 
212 See generally LEWIS & HASTINGS, supra note 95, at 38-41. 
213 The author does not in any way think that such burdens are necessarily fair in most 
circumstances, but is merely pointing out that they exist. Sometimes other issues become 
more immediate concerns. For instance, as America's gun culture comes into schools, 
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in matters relating to student drug use 214 and student civility,215 school 
districts bear a great deal of responsibility for their charges. Although 
one may bemoan requiring that schools be responsible for controlling 
sexual harassment, that horse has left the bam: school districts know it 
is out there, and the Guidance tells them what to do about it.216 Having 
been put on actual notice of this pandemic, school districts are now going 
to be harder pressed to inoculate themselves from responsibility for doing 
nothing in the face of any type of complaint. It therefore behooves the 
litigants to be cognizant of not just the details of any particular harassing 
event but also of hostility in the school environment itself, particularly 
in light of those cases when successful plaintiffs stressed the systemic 
failure of the school district to protect the children involved. 
In its own review of Title IX compliance, the OCR looks at the 
following indicia of a hostile environment in schools: 
•The degree to which the conduct affected one or more student's 
education .... 
•The type, frequency, and duration of the conduct.. ... 
•The identity of and relationship between the alleged harasser and the 
subject or subjects of the harassment. ... . 
•The number of individuals involved ... . 
•The age and sex of the alleged harasser and the subject or subjects of 
the harassment. . . . 
•The size of the school, location of the incidents, and context in which 
they occurred. . . . 
•Other incidents at the school .... 
• Incidents of gender-based but nonsexual harassment. ... 217 
teachers and a<hninistrators must often resort to putting out the biggest fires. "Among 
the most alarming reports, 28% of teens say they are aware of peers who have carried 
or regularly carry guns and knives when they are in school." GEORGE H. GALLUP, 
GROWING UP S,CARED IN AMERICA AND WHAT THE EXPERTS SAY PARENTS CAN DO 
ABOUT IT 3 (1995). 
214 See, e.g., Earls, 536 U.S. at 831 (approving drug testing of students involved in 
extracurricular activities). 
215 See, e.g., Bethel, 478 U.S. at 683-84 (approving restrictions on students' First 
Amendment rights while on campus). 
216 See, e.g., Martha McCarthy, Students as Ta~gets and Perpetrators of Sexual 
Harassment." Title IX and Beyond, 12 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 177, 212 (2001). 
217 REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 185, at 6-7. 
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The wise litigant investigates all these bases in preparation for filing a 
complaint and in preparing for the inevitable motions. Stressing that 
these responsibilities already redound to school districts as recipients 
under Title IX should make it harder for school officials to suggest they 
have no actual knowledge.218 
In contrast, students have been aware of sexual harassment in schools 
long before the courts were aware. In its 1993 seminal survey, Hostile 
Hallways,219 the American Association ofUniversity Women (AA.._ .... 
Educational Foundation painted a bleak picture: four in five students 
experienced sexual harassment in school, affecting the educational 
environment for both girls and boys.220 One-third of the students stated 
that they experienced sexual harassment in elementary school.221 The 
2001 AAUW Survef22 evinced no improvement in the intervening years 
and nearly a generation of public school students; the same percentage 
of students surveyed reported that they were sexually harassed in school 
at some time in their lives, while the percentage of boys so reporting 
increased. 223 
In their special and presumably protected school enviromnent, students 
report that sexual harassment most often occurs in the hallways and 
classroom. 224 The publicity ofhumiliation is often the motivation for this 
218 In addition, a growing bank ofliterature exists to assist school districts and school 
adtninistrators in curbing hostile school environments, some of which predates Gebser 
and Davis. A school district that feigns lack ofknowledge of the problem simply is not 
looking. See, e.g., BRANDENBURG, supra note 199; LEWIS & HASTINGS, supra note 95; 
MICHELE A. PALUDI & RICHARD B. BARICKMAN, ACADEMIC AND WORKPLACE SEXUAL 
IIARASSMENT:AREsOURCEMANUAL(1991);SHOOP&EDWARDS,supranote66;STEIN, 
supra note 96. 
219 AM. ASS 'N OF UNNERSITY WOMEN EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION, HOSTaEHALL-
WAYS:THEAAUWSURVEYONSEXUALHARASSMENTINAMERICA'SSCHOOLS4(1993). 
220 /d.; Bodensteiner, supra note 16, at 3-4. Other national and state surveys are 
outlined by Nan Stein. STEIN, supra note 96, at 10-27, 98-102, 117-21. 
221 2001 HOSTILE HALLWAYS, supra note 163, at 20. 
222 /d. 
223 /d. at 3-4. The 2001 survey reported that"[ eighty percent] of students experience 
some form of sexual harassment during their school lives.'' /d. The survey acknowl-
edged, however, that school districts made progress since the 1990s to either impQse 
sexual harassment policies and/or distribute educational literature. /d. 
224 /d. at 27. 
• 
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gendered te"orism. As the above-described cases exemplify, "[i]n 
schools, sexual harassment happens in full view of others-in public places 
such as hallways, lunchrooms, physical education classes, on school 
buses, on school playgrounds, in classrooms, and at school sponsored 
activities. "225 Of course, the public nature of the humiliation has more 
serious ramifications for the victims. 226 
As such, litigants need to be cognizant of two things vis a vis the 
school environment. First, the existence of a hostile environment makes 
it harder for school officials to claim they do not have actual knowledge. 
Even if a school official were to testify to the contrary, students know 
better. Second, schools now have actual notice of their responsibilities 
concerning Title IX, and the failure to abide by them may contribute to 
a plaintiffs proof of the school's deliberate indifference. It is now no 
longer acceptable to ignore the very public face of peer sexual harassment 
and chalk it up to childhood inunaturity, flirting, or rites ofpassage.227 
That innocence is gone in some schools, and viciousness has taken its 
place. 
B. Of Sugar & Spice and Snips & Snails: 
Gender and Student Sexuality Under Title IX 
Peer sexual harassment is fundarnentally about gender issues in the 
special school environment. However, student sexuality is a critical 
adjunct to both gender issues and the hostility of the environment, 
especially in understanding the following two elements of a peer sexual 
225 NAN D. STEIN, SECRETS IN PUBLIC: SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN PUBLIC (AND PRI-
VATE) SCHOOLS 2 (1993). 
Examples of sexual harassment that happen in public include attempts to snap bras 
and grope at girls~ bodies; to puU down gym shorts or flip up skirts; circulation of 
"summa cum.slutty" or "piece of ass of the week" lists; designation ofspecial weeks 
for ugrabbing the private parts ofthe girls;" nasty, personalized graffiti written on 
the bathroom walls; sexualized jokes and taunts which mock girls' bodies; and 
outright physical assault and even rape in schools. 
/d. at 2-3. Recent evidence indicates similar harassment occurs with boys whose sexual 
orientation or sexuality is questioned. 
226 /d. at 3. 
227 See /d.; LEWIS & HASTINGS, supra note 95, at 25. 
288 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRIAL ADVOCACY [Vol. 29:243 
harassment claim: whether the perpetrator's behavior is severe, pervasive, 
and objectively offensive, and whether the victim's response t() that 
behavior is proof of denial of access to the school's educational opportu-
nities. Both elements are tied to each other in an objective-subjective 
paradigm as the litigator prepares the evidence in the case and frames the 
issues around that evidence. First, was the behavior objectively offen-
sive? Second, did the student subjectively believe that the school's 
response to the behavior denied him equal access to educational opportu-
. . ? 
mt1es. 
In proving gender discrimination, the actionable misconduct often has 
sexual overtones. Accordingly, a child's ability to understand those over-
tones-as both perpetrator and victim-may color a claim. Courts must not 
b·e allowed to underestimate the sexual development of children at a very 
early age. In many of the reported cases, the courts seemed to distance 
themselves from the realities of human sexuality. Relying on children's 
inability to formulate abstract thought about their sexuality, courts asst1111e 
that children are not sexual (or perhaps are viewed as asexual) and there-
fore either cannot engage in sexual harassment or misunderstand mere 
flirting. 228 The courts are sadly mistaken. 
From birth, children are in an intimate and physical relationship with 
their mothers. From suckling at their mothers' breasts to hygienic care 
of their genitalia, children are early stimulated in sensual areas of their 
bodies. 229 They also observe appropriate fonns of showing affection such 
as kissing, stroking, and similar forms of affection. 230 By the age of four 
or five, children start experimenting with secret sex play-playing doctor-
nurse-patient ga1nes and familial role-playing games-and start experi-
menting with nudity. Children may not articulate their reasons for 
engaging in such behavior other than that it feels good; at the same time, 
adults begin to punish them for this forbidden behavior. In response, 
children become more conscious and modest about such behavior.231 
Early childhood is also the stage when children begin being educated 
about avoiding sexual abuse through such programs as Good-Touch/Bad-
228 See, e.g., Gabrielle M., 315 F .3d at 823. 
229 FLOYD M. MARTINSON, THE SEXUAL LIFE OF CHILDREN 5-11 (1994). 
230 !d. at 35-36. 
231 ld. at 36-38. 
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Touch®. 232 This instruction begins as early as preschool and reaches well 
into the intermediate grades in elementary school. Thus,-very young 
children have a pretty good idea of what is and what is not sexual 
behavior although they may not be able to articulate it. 
Farther along that continuum, preadolescents have an extremely high 
interest in sex although they have abandoned the innocent play of 
childhood. Instead, sexual infotmation comes through the influence of 
adults through their taboos and other observed behaviors. Separate gender 
roles also become more apparent, with a male-oriented sexual subculture 
encouraging and· supporting sexual activity.233 By this time, sexual 
thinking becomes more abstract, and children understand more about 
biological issues and wish to have more infonnation than perhaps their 
parents would prefer or are willing to offer.234 
Adolescents have their own, often problematic, chronology of sexual 
development and maturity. Part of these problems of course arises 
because-sexual maturity thatbegins in-preadolescence has far outstripped 
adolescent cognitive functioning: what they lack in social maturity, they 
more than make up for in sexual maturity.235 Adolescent sexual chal-
lenges include 
adjusting to the altered appearance and functioning of a sexually maturing 
body, learning to deal with sexual desires, confronting sexual attitudes and 
values, experimenting with sexual behaviors, and integrating these feelings, 
attitudes, and experiences into a developing sense of self. The challenge is 
accentuated by the unfamiliar excitement of sexual arousal, the attention 
connected to b,eing sexually attractive, and the new level of physical intimacy 
and psychological vulnerability created by sexual encounters.236 
232 To visit the Good-Touch/Bad-Touch® program website, go to http://www. 
goodtouchbadtouch.com 
233 MARTINSON, supra note 229, at 39-40. 
234 See, e.g., RONALD GOLDMAN & JULIEITE GOLDMAN, CHILDREN'S SEXUAL 
THINKJNG: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CHILDREN AGED 5 TO 15 YEARS IN AUSTRALIA, 
NORTH AMERICA, BRITAIN AND SWED'EN 389-93 (1982). 
235 ROGER]. R. LEVESQUE, ADoLESCENTS, SEX, AND THE LAW: PREPARING ADOLES-
CENTS FOR RESPONSIBLE CITIZENSHIP 23 (2000). 
236 Lisa J. Crockett, Marcela Raffaelli & Kristin L. Moilanen, Adolescent S~xuality: 
Behavior and Meaning, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF ADOLESCENCE 371 (Gerald R. 
Adams & Michael D. Berzonsky eds. 2003). 
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Pile onto these challenges the fact that many cultural influences promote 
sexual permissiveness, if not promiscuity, and the fact that American 
adolescents often receive little guidance in responsible sexual behavior, 237 
and schools face a potent brew ofhonnones and violence. 
These are the variously aged and variously maturing customers for 
whose safety and well-being schools are being held accountable, hence 
courts' deference to governance in these special environments and the 
respons_es to the problems. 
Sometimes lost in the consideration of peer harassment cases is the 
analysis_ that focuses_ on the conduct's gender--not just sexual-context. 
Similar to sexuality, gender relationships have a role in school environ-
ments. For young children, gender roles do not have much definition 
although they are aware of physical differences. Not until they are told 
they can no longer expose their nudity to each other do children con-
cretely perceive the differences, although perhaps not the stereotypical 
roles.238 Children then learn gender distinctions by the real and cultural 
b-ehaviors to which they become socialized.239 Preadolescence blurs 
distinctions between the genders: boys and girls often o_verlap in activities, 
sports, and apparel. However, girls are more likely to become the 
untouchables in society, and children start to perceive social status 
differences in the genders. Likewise untouchable are those children who 
are perceived as less popular, less likely to have a romantic (and therefore 
sexual) liaison. Therefore, teasing at this age is linked with gender roles 
and stigma.240 Later, adolescents experience an intensification of gender 
roles, and their psychological handicaps in wrestling with those roles 
result in exaggerated gender stereotyping. Intensified gender stereotyping 
leads to inappropriate expectations of how the genders must and should 
237 See, e.g., Susan Shurberg Klein, Why Should We Care About Gender and 
Sexuality in Education?, in SEXUALITY AND THE CURRICULUM: THE Po-LITICS AND 
PRACfiCESOF SEXUALITY EDUCATION 171-72.(James T. Sears ed., 1992) [hereinafter 
SEXUALITY AND THE CURRICULUM]. 
238 MARTINSON, supra note 229, at 37-39. 
239 James T. Sears, The Impact of Culture and Ideology on the Construction of 
Gender and Sexual Identities: Developing a Critically Based Sexuality Curriculum, in 
SEXUALITY AND THE CURRICULUM, supra note 237, at 141. 
240 /d. at 143-45. 
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act at both extremes of the spectrum,241 stereotypes that are often 
reinforced in schools. 242 Thus, in tandem with a better ,abstract cognition 
of sexual behavior, the sexuality of adolescent peer harassment takes on 
a sharper focus than in elementary ,school. 
But even at this more abstract level of cognition, 243 sexual harassment 
is viewed by its effect on the victim, not necessarily by the action. Thus, 
students see this as a gender rather than a sexual issue. Courts that 
examine sexuality or lack thereof in the harassing act to the exclusion of 
the gender roles miss the point. 
[B ]oth boys and girls emphasize in their definitions [of sexual 'harassment] 
the effects of the action on the victim, whether intended or not, rather than 
the action itself. For many, sexual harassment connotes verbal or physical 
actions that create discomfort for the subject These defmitions mirror 
prevalent legal definitions of sexual harassment in the workplace, which 
emphasize the creation of a hostile work environment through verbal or 
physical actions that cause discomfort.244 
From the students' standpoint, the most egregious fomts of sexual harass-
ment in which their fellow students eng,age are spreading sexual rumors, 
pulling off (or down) their clothing, saying they were gay or lesbian, 
forcing them to do something sexual other than kissing, spying on them 
as they dressed or showered at school, and writing sexual messages or 
241 LEVESQUE, supra note 235, at 213-14. The intensity of the adolescent experience 
also increases the violence in the gender dynamics. Adolescents engage in more high-
risk behaviors yet are more susceptible to peer pressure and confonnity. Consequently, 
adolescents are also more susceptible to abusive "romantic" relationships as well as 
experimentation with dangerous, adult behaviors. Unfortunately, they are not 
emotionally able to deal with the fallout. /d. at 223-27. Adolescents also receive the 
message that ,each gender has its own. Hsexual scripting." Mara Sapon-Shevin & Jesse 
Goodman, Learning to Be the Opposite Sex, in SEXUALITY AND THE CURRICULUM, supra 
note 237, at 89. 
242 BRANDENBURG, supra note 199, at 43-44. 
243 The AA UW study used subjects in eighth through eleventh grades, approximately 
ages thirteen to seventeen. 2001 HOSTILE HALLWAYS, supra note 163, at 46. 
244 /d. at 9. "When defming sexual harassment, many students· emphasize that the 
behaviors must be unwelcome, unwanted, orunreciprocated. Several male respondents, 
in particular, defme sexual harassment as the persistence of unwanted behaviors even 
after the subjects make their intentions clear or behaviors and actions that do not mesh 
with the subjects' desires or wishes." /d. 
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graffiti about them on bathroom walls, in locker rooms, etc.245- This list 
and the students' perceptions that these were the most upsetting fornts 
of sexual harassment do not jibe with some courts' requirement that the 
behavior be of a sexual nature as well as being objectively offensive. To 
the contrary, children have the same responses to gendered harassment 
that adults in the workplace do; the law just does not always recognize 
that. Plaintiffs counsel must therefore be sensitive to the fact that both 
gender roles and sexual politics are integral to proof of the perpetrator's 
actionable conduct-proof of its severity, pervasiveness, and objective 
offensiveness. In so doing, counsel must account for the differing weights 
accorded those factors by victims of different ages. 
Counsel also must weave throughout such proof the thread of the 
conduct's objective offensiveness on the reasonable student. Perhaps a 
reasonable-child standard should 'be advocated. For instance, a 
reasonable-girl standard could be adopted when the cause of action 
involves a boy harassing a girl.246 This standard would more closely 
reflect the reality ofbeing a girl in the specialized environment at a certain 
maturity level and with the particularized experiences of the gender, not 
unlike the reasonable-woman standard used in Title VII cases.247 It is also 
a pennutation of the reasonable-child standard used in tort law,248 the 
generic source which should make a similar inquiry adaptable to those 
c_ases when boys are the victims. 249 An additional, helpful, and objective 
perspective might appe_al to parental protectiveness, an in-court use of 
the "teachable moment"_: hypothesizing how the judge or the individual 
members of the jury would react if counsel asked when the judge's 
daughter could come to court so the jury "could get a look at her tits . "250 
24s !d. at 10-11. 
246 See~ e.g . ., Carrie L. Hoon, The Reasonable Girl: A New Reasonableness Standard 
to Detennine Sexual Harassment in_ Schools, 76 WASH. L. REv. 213 (2001). 
247 /d. at 233-34; see also STEIN, supra note 96, at 31-32. 
248 Hoon, supra note 246, at 226. 
249 Similarly, the standard from the Supreme Court is useful: the reasonable person 
"in the plaintiff's position considering 'all the-circumstances.'" Oncale v. Sundowner 
Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U .. S. 75; 81 (1998) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 
U.S. 17, 23 ( 1993)). See generally CAROLINE A. FORELL & DONNA M. MA'I*l'HEWS, A 
LAW OF HER OWN: THE REASONABLE WOMAN AS A MEASURE OF MAN 34-69 (2000); 
Hoon, supra note 246, at 232~ 
250 SHOOP&_ EDWARDS, supra note 66, at 54-55. At least it worked for Matthew 
McConaughey in the climactic closing argument in the film, A Time to Kill. 
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At that moment, the Title IX doubter understands not only the objective 
offensiveness of the behavior but also the impact on the child's access 
to education. 
A litigator also needs to be cognizant of the specialness ofthe school 
environment when assessing whether the victim's access to that environ-
ment has been affected. Every school has its idiosyncrasies, but the basic 
physical plant, curriculum, and extracu1ricular activities must be exain-
ined. The student workplace has little parallel in the adult workplace, so 
the physical plant and the public areas are relevant. These little workers 
are crammed in relatively I..arge numbers to work together in rooms, in 
closer proximity than production-line, factory work. Then there are the 
public corridors for passing between classe.s, student storage in lockers, 
and passage to anyplace in the building. The next aspect is the academic 
envirorunent: what children learn, under what circumstances they leant 
best, their learrting styles, their work habits, and their ultimate success 
in any particular subject. The third concern includes other activities that 
may comprise the educational program to which a student might be 
excluded. If one views extracurricular activities as integral to academic 
success, such as sports, theatre, social and academic organizations, and 
musical groups, then a student's feeling unable to participate could affect 
her access to the educational program. Any nutnber of other idiosyncra-
sies can be included that might be affected by harassment, like group 
undress and conununal toilet facilities. 
Counsel must also be attentive to the very subjectivity of the victim's 
response to the offensive conduct, the proof of which is a bit like quick-
silver and hard to quantify: what constitutes exclusion from the educa-
tional program? Harassing conduct often occasions an emotional impact; 
nearly half the students surveyed by the AAUW reported being very or 
somewhat upset after experiencing perceived sexual harassment. 251 
Although such evidence may not of itself warrant recovery under Title 
IX,252 an emotional impact can have a direct effect on students' access 
to their educational programs. Significant percentages of students found 
themselves not talking as much in class, not wanting to go to school, 
changing their seating_ assigrnnents, finding it hard to pay attention in 
251 2001 HOSTILE HALLWAYS, supra note 163, at 32. 
2
.5
2 But see Harris, 510 U.S. at 22 (holding that Title VII does not require proof of 
psychological batm). · 
• 
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school, staying away from certain school locations, finding it hard to 
study, and staying home from school or cutting class.-253 
The fallout ofTitle IX harassment must be directly tied to the program, 
·not just the fact of the emotional, psychological, and physical conse-
quences. So, counsel must be able to define what exactly that environ-
mentshouldbe or should have been for the victim. Perhaps an educator's 
or a parent's perspective will be useful. Regardless,_ the child's own sub-
jective notions of what he expects from the safety of school must figure 
prominently in presenting evidence of denial ofhis access. All such proof 
must stress the importance of education to children's growth, maturity, 
and civic responsibilities. 
One of America's preeminent educational philosophers, John Dewey, 
attributed several distinct values to education: necessity of life, social 
function, growth, and instillation of direction and discipline.254 As an 
institution integral to democracy~ schools must inculcate the values of a 
democratic society. 255 To do that, schools should ideally create a climate 
and culture conducive to a leanting conununity, a positive school climate 
that is committed to students and their learning.256 And to do that, schools . 
should be safe. "A safe school is. where teachers can teach and students 
can learn in a welcoming environment, free of fear and intimidation. It 
is an educational setting where the climate promotes a spirit of acceptance 
and care for every child . . . ~ "257 The Supreme Court most famously 
characterized schools this way:: 
1s3 /d. at 36-37. Girls are more likely than boys to suffer these experiences, while 
students who underwent physical sexual harassment were more likely to suffer. /d. 
ls-4 See generally JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION: AN INTRODUCTION 
TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION (Macmillan Co. 1966) (1944)'! 
2ss "Such a society must have a type of education which gives individuals a personal 
interest in social relationships and control, and the habits of mind which secure social 
changes without introducing disorder." /d. at 99. 
lS6 JAMES W. KEEFE&JOHN M. JENKINS, INSTRUCTION AND THE LEARNING ENVIRON-
MENT 9-10 ( 1997). "All major stakeholders-students, teachers, parents and_ cormoonity-
will view the school environment in a positive fashion. The shared perceptions of all 
these stakeholders will validate the academic orientation of the school, its sense of col-
lective responsibility and the sustained commitment to ,students and their learning." /d. 
at 10. 
257 ANNE G. GARREIT, KEEPING AMERICAN SCHOOLS SAFE: A HANDBOOK FOR 
PARENTS, STUDENTS, EOUCA TORS, LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL AND THE COM-
MUNfrY 64 (2001). 
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[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and local gov-
errunents. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures 
for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of educa-
tion to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most 
basic public responsibilities, even service in the anned forces. It is the very 
foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instruntent in awaken-
ing the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional train-
ing, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, 
it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life 
if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where 
the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available 
to all on equal terms. 258 
The litigator might thus emphasize that there is a certain tipping point at 
which, physical exclusion or not, psychological exclusion from an educa-
tion not only violates Title IX but also is a dereliction of the state's duty 
to the child. 
The preceding discussion should impress upon counsel to itrunerse 
herself in this very unusual world. She must frame the case-and indeed 
the themes of the case-around that unique climate. 
C. The Litigation Themes 
Based on the literature and the cases, counsel might consider adopting 
one or more of several themes in a peer sexual harassment case. Such 
themes may include the funda1nental gender-bullying aspect of the most 
successful cases, emphasis on the severity of the harassment, the two 
primary models of peer harassment, and the nature of exclusion from the 
educational program. Given the facts of the cases above in which a 
plaintiff was successful in progressing beyond a dispositive motion, these 
themes can be distilled as follows. 
First, the systemic harassment in successful cases was directed either 
at female students or at male students who were perceived as having 
effeminate qualities (i.e., who were believed to be gay). The attacks 
smacked of sexuality but really were directed more at that gender or 
victim who seemed weaker. That pattern buttresses the notion that these 
lss Brown v. Bd. ofEduc. of Topeka~ Shawnee County, Kan., 347 U.S. 483, 493 
(1954), supplemented by 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
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cases really are perhaps more about gender discrimination than about 
sex.259 One of the lessons learned in these successful cases is that the 
ostensibly sexual aspects are coupled with gender-bullying, a combination 
of power and sex.260 
Tied to the first is the second feature of a successful ·plaintiffs 
response to summary judgment,. which is an emphasis on the severity of 
the harassment. Obviously, the pervasiveness ofrepeated and unrelenting 
attacks adds to that emphasis. But proof in the successful harassment 
cases combined powerissues as well as gender and sexuality in a manner 
intended to humiliate-virtual rape, if you will. Rape is often acknowl-
edged to be less a crime of sexuality and more a crime of violence. 
Indeed, one theory of rape is derived from the ''cultural spillover" theory 
that ''rape may be in.fluenced by the implicit or explicit approval of 
violence in various areas of life such ,as education, the· mass media, or 
sports."261 Although a direct correlation between rape and legitimate, 
socially approved violence cannot necessarily be drawn, an indirect coree-
259 The sexual harassment-discrimination dichotomy has borne at least four different 
explanatory models that might fruitfully be applied to defme sexual harassment: ( 1) the 
"formal equality" model,(2) the "sexual content" model, (3) the ''subordination" model, 
and ( 4) the "gender regulation" model. Daniel G. McBride, Guidance for Student Peer 
Sexual Harassment? Not!, 50 STAN. L. REv. 523,541-547 (1998); see ,also Katherine 
M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REv. 691 (1997). 
These philosophical models, of course, were extrapolated before Davis. However, be-
cause each case is so fact-sensitive and motive-specific, no one model really assists in 
creating the theme, nor for practical purposes are they really necessary. 
260 
"Most theories and models describe sexual harassment as a way to obtain sex 
and/or to abuse or increase power." BRANDENBURG, supra note 199, at 40 (citation 
omitted). One approach suggests that we re-orient our thinking about the sexuality part 
of the behavior when it comes to children: the motive is not to receive something sexual 
from the victim; rather the motive is to foist sexual abuse on the victim. Shelby Jean, 
Peer Sexual Harassment Since Oncale and Davis: Taking the 'Sex I out of 'Sexual 
Harassm,ent,' 2000 MICH. ST. L. REV. 485,489--90 (2000). 
. ' 
.
261 LARRY BARON & MURRAY A. STRAUS, FOUR THEORIES OF RAPE IN AMERICAN 
SOCIETY: A STATE-LEVELANALYSIS 9 (1989) (emphasis added); see generally SUSAN 
BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE ( 1975); RANDY THORN-
HILL&CRAIGT.PALMER,ANATURALHISTORYOFRAPE:BIOI.OGICALBASESOFSEXUAL 
COERCION 124-28 (2000). Another theory suggests that rape is a biological and evolu-
tional construct that might be triggered by many things, including violence. THORNHILL 
&PAlMER, supra, at 4. However, other studies dispute the significance ofbotb genetic 
and honnonal influences on male violence. Angela K. Turner, Genetic and Honnonal 
Influences on Male Violence, in MALE VIOLENCE_233, 246-4 7 (John Archer ed. 1994). 
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lation exists because the status of women is usually lower in those areas 
where violence is more highly valued. 262 Likewise, the motivation for 
sexual harassment is as much about power as it is about sex. 263 "Like any 
other power struggle, many instances of sexual harassment are initiated 
and negotiated by a person in a position of authority and are sustained at 
the expense of another who cannot counter demands without risk of re-
prisal. "264 AI though peer harassment does not fall neatly into that theorem, 
student victims tend to be those who are considered weaker or are sub-
jected to harassment by a group. As a result, more successful cases 
protect males rather than females, perhaps because the notion of male rape 
is so alien to the bench that the perception of harm to boys is considered 
greater. 265 
That _power dynamic is then mixed with the biological imperative of 
humans in children, which cannot be underestimated as a motive for 
student sexual harassment. 266 The primary reasons for which students 
admit they engaged in sexually harassing behavior toward other students-
"it's just a part of school life," the perpetrator thought the victim liked 
it, the perpetrator wanted a date with the victim, and the perpetrator's 
friends encouraged him-have mixed motivations of sexual socialization 
and approval ofviolence.267 The more violent reasons for these students 
engaging in sexual harassment were to exert power over the victim or to 
extract something from the victim. 
The theme therefore for severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive 
behavior-its severity in particular-is to blur the lines between sexual 
behavior and power over the weak, especially in instances when the 
harassment did not last for months or years. The victim who proves the 
school atmosphere both intimidated the victim and had an aura of sex and 
262 BARON & STRAUS, supra note 261, at 187. 
263 ROBERT J. SHOOP & JACK W. HAYHOW, JR., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN OUR 
SCHOOLS: WHAT PARENTS AND TEACHERS NEED TO KNOW TO SPOT IT AND STOP IT! 
29-32 (1994). 
264 BRANDENBURG, supra note 199, at 5 (citation omitted). 
26
s That harm tnay be actual: because boys are expected to "take it like a man," they 
endure such harassment without complaint longer than girls do. 
266 See generally THORNHILL & PALMER, supra note 261. 
267 2001 HOSTILE HALLWAYS, supra note 163, at 41. 
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power is better able to prove a hostile environment sufficient to hold a 
school district liable. 268 If the severity of the attacks is emphasized, 
perhaps less proof of pervasiveness will be required. 
Third,-the victim might be attentive to the theme suggested by the 
mode of harassment. The illustrative cases usually involve only the 
following two models of peer sexual harassment: one perpetrator with 
one or more victims, or one victim with numerous -perpetrators. Histori-
cally, the one perpetrator-one victim scenario is harder to win. That 
outcome might be because those cases isolate individual acts of harass-
• 
ment without accounting for either a hostile environment Sl..Jrrounding the 
victim or the victim's perception of a hostile environment. Proving 
systemic harassment in ,a one-on-one situation could be more successful 
if the victim proves that, as far as he is concerned, the harassment was 
systemic and that the one perpetrator made the victim's school environ-
ment hostile. Of course, evidence from the perpetrator's other victims, 
if any, should be sought out, even if the incidents evinced only violence 
rather than sex or gender issues~ But the point here is to piggy-back this 
theme onto the previous theme when few incidents have occurred. 
On the other hand, when the group -harasses the pariah-the several 
perpetrators-one victim scenario-plaintiff-victims have a much easier 
time proving a Title IX claim. The number of' incidents, the ongoing 
nature of the harassment, and the cultural acceptance of the pack to attack 
the weak leads, the courts to a better sense of a systemic hostile environ-
. . 
ment. The theme of this type ofharassment should obviously emphasize 
pervasiveness and the systemic nature of the violence. But related to this 
is the theme of the very public nature of the ongoing attacks, hence, a 
lower burden of proving the school district's actual knowledge and 
. . 
deliberate indifference. 
Fourth is the theme necessary to persuade the trier of fact that the vic-
tim has been excluded from equal access to educational opportunity, even 
with onlyps,ychological results. To begin, the litigant must associate her-
self with the appropriate reasonable-student standard. Title Vll standards 
268 One must be careful not to blur the lines between bullying and sexual harassment. 
See, e.g., Stein, supra note 96, at 783. However, given the difficulty in proving a sexual 
harassment claim, it may serve plaintiff's interest to also explore state court claims under 
anti-bullying or anti-harassment legislation. 
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of the reasonable woman are going to involve a different analysis than 
for public schoolchildren of nearly any age. Although some students have 
become somewhat inured to sexual harassment under circumstances that 
might reflect adult reactions,269 nearly half are not. Instead, they experi-
ence embarrassment, self-consciousness, fear, loss of confidence, con-
fusion, and doubts about whether they can succeed in school. 270 The 
victim should exploit data that counsels that younger victims of rape 
suffer greater psychological pain ftomthe attack than do oldervictims.271 
Therefore, the victim should tap into expert witnesses who could actually 
attest to something that might not otherwise be within the expertise of 
the trier of fact, like the subjective and objective realities of a hostile 
educational environment.272 . 
Those psychological feelings must then be appended to actual alien-
ation, or exclusion, from the educational program, or at least from the 
sense of safety the children should feel in school. According to the 
National School Safety Center, 
[i]n an attempt to escape the harassment, the victim plans activities around 
an avoidance schedule. Her inability to stop the harassment results in anger, 
humiliation, and shame. A sense ofbetrayal and stigmatization often results 
in isolation and withdrawal from others. Even those few who stand up and 
fight often lose the battle, thereby reinforcing the feelings of helplessness 
generated by the abuse.273 
Children who have b'een harassed think differently about themselves, their 
school experience, and their classmates, 274 regardless of adult percep-
269 2001 HOSTILE HALLWAYS, supra note 163, at 27. 
270 /d. at 32-36. 
271 THORNHILL & PALMER, supra note 261, at 89-90. 
272 See, e.g., Jeremy D. Pasternak; Comment, Sexual.Harassment and Expertise: The 
Admissibility of Expert Witness Testimony in Cases Utilizing the Reasonable Woman 
Standard, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 651 (1995); Donna Shestowsky, Note, Where is 
the-Common Knowledge? Empirica/SupportforRequiringExpert Testimony in Sexual 
Harassment Trials, 51 STAN. L. REv. 357 (1999). 
273 SHOOP & HA YHOW, supra note 263, at 56. 
274 /d.; Tianna McClure, Boys Will Be Boys.~ Peer Sexual Harassm_ent in_ Schools and 
the Implications of Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 12 HASTINGS 
WOMEN'S ·L.1. 95,103-05 (2001). 
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tions, for student access to the educational opportunity has been altered. 
At a vulnerable time in their lives when they are supposed to see schools 
as safe havens and adults as their protectors, these students experience 
conduct that alters_ both their outlook on education and their own emotion-
al wellbeing. 215 Thus, a plaintiffs lawyer is well-advised to seek deeper 
roots of exclusion than just the physical aspects. 
Developing a couple, if not all, ofthese themes would put counsel on 
more even footing with the school district and would create a source of 
education to the court. 276 
For its part, the theme that a school district will and must follow will 
draw to its strong suit: its officials did not act with deliberate indifference 
because they know schools are the custodial repository for children, and 
they take their responsibilities seriously. As discussed earlier, this 
specific element has proved to ·be most nettlesome for plaintiffs, espe-
cially when schools follow an investigative procedure and mete out at 
least some palliative remedy. Schools and teachers are in a tough spot 
these days, with all the new legal and social duties imposed upon. them 
for accountability, student behavior, social work, and sometimes even 
education gets attention. Therefore, the theme. schools will always fall 
back on~if they have done these two things-is that the courts should 
c.ontinue to defer to schools in matters of discipline and not second-guess 
the measures that have been taken in this specialized environment. 
A plaintiff must always respond with a two-pronged plan of attack, 
both of which are inherent in the themes discussed above. First, the 
plaintiffmust emphasize there is still lawyer-like context in the plaintiffs 
cause of action so that the court cannot abdicate its judicial function in 
a misplaced effort to defer to the school district's wisdom. Second, the 
plaintiff must also stress that the review of the school district's responses 
27s Is such fluff the stuff of a plaintifrs case? Perhaps not entirely, but putting more 
emphasis on what parents expect and what children actually experience at least creates 
the theme of how children are treated in their own workplace under circumstances that 
sometimes would seem daunting even to adults. 
276 Plaintifrs counsel must similarly develop a list of expert witnesses to counter-
balance the school district's witnesses. Of particular use would be education and psych-
ology professors; child psychologists, other cbild advocates, retired teachers and 
administrators,_ and the like. The school district has its own, ready .. made stable of expert 
witnesses at its disposal. Plaintiff's counsel does well to keep that in mind. 
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and remedial measures to peer harassment are not outside the court's 
expertise. A court can clearly interpret whether a school is keeping its 
children safe with the appropriate atmosphere and whether a school's 
remedy has any meaningful chance of preventing or otherwise ameliorat-
ing further harassment. If a court cannot make that type of judgment call, 
then a school district's responses have no boundaries. Courts can discern 
on a case-by-case basis what constitutes sexual harassment and what is 
not a school district's clearly unreasonable response.277 Specialized 
environment or not, schools are the workplace for children. If a victim's 
counsel takes the time to educate the court about that environment, 
perhaps Title IX cases will become more successful. 
Conclusion 
Trying an education case should not be as difficult as it sometimes is, 
but the fear imbued in courts that school districts are more knowledgeable 
than they has made courts exercise a greater an1ount of deference than 
some cases warrant. Some cases really are outside the expertise of the 
courts, but Title IX litigation is not really one of those kinds of cases. 
Instead, Title IX more closely resembles the tort-like, legal types of cases 
that courts have tried for decades and in countless courthouses, especially 
its direct analog, Title Vll. However, given the constraints created by 
Davis and Gebser, plaintiffs' counsel will be forced to educate themselves 
better about that specialized educational environment. Those efforts will, 
of course, be most successful when both sides can work on equal footing 
and open up to the courts themselves the secrets of school districts at least 
to a small extent to protect both boys and girls from a gendered violence 
that is becoming, sadly, more prevalent and just as sadly unresolved . 
• 
277 Davies, supra note 32, at 429-30. 
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